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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970229-CA

v.
Priority No.

LISA DEHERRERA,

2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1997), in the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable, Ray M. Harding, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Should this Court consider whether the Administrative

Traffic Checkpoint Act is constitutional when that determination
is both unnecessary and inadequate to fully resolve whether
evidence should have been suppressed?

This is an issue of this

Court's appellate discretion.
2.

Did law enforcement officers act with objective good

faith in relying on a circuit court's approval of a checkpoint

plan later found out of compliance with the checkpoint statute?
A trial court's conclusion that an officer relied in good
faith on a defective search warrant is subject to de novo review,
by the appellate court.

United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d

927, 929 (10th Cir 1990); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992).
However, since the legal conclusion of official good faith is
ultimately a determination of "objectively reasonable reliance"
on a search warrant, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984), it should not be subjected to a close de novo review.
See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994)(a trial
courtfs determination of a fact sensitive legal issue itself
"conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge[s]" so that
they can "grapple with the multitude of fact patterns" involved).
3.

Has defendant articulated an adequate basis for

departing from clear and uniform Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
for this Court to conclude that there is no good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution?

This is a legal question of constitutional

interpretation, reviewed for correctness.

State v. Arbon, 909

P.2d 1270, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions and rules are set
out in Addendum A.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lisa DeHerrera, was charged with possession or
use of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, a third degree
felony (Count I), unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a
Class A misdemeanor (Count II), driving on a revoked driver's
license, a Class C misdemeanor (Count III), driving without
insurance, a Class B misdemeanor (Count IV), and driving with
expired registration, a Class C misdemeanor (Count V)(R. 5-7).
Defendant filed separate motions with supporting memoranda to
suppress evidence obtained from the search of her person
("Personal Search Motion," R. 41-49), following an alleged
illegal roadblock ("Roadblock Motion," R. 51-82).

Following an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motions (R.
103.1-103; see "Memorandum Decision," R. 106.1-110, attached at
Addendum B ) .
In exchange for the dismissal of all other charges,
defendant pleaded no contest to Count I, preserving for appeal
those issues raised in her roadblock motion, pursuant to State v.
Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 111-14, 117-124, 12526). 1

After defendant executed and the trial court accepted the
1

On appeal, defendant argues that there was no justifiable basis
for the Terrv frisk, a claim argued separately in the trial court
("Personal Search Motion," R. 41-49) from her roadblock motion (R. 5182). Appellant's Br. at Point IV, pp. 41-45. However, because
defendant expressly preserved for appeal only those issues raised in
her roadblock motion, the Terrv frisk issue is not properly before
this Court on appeal (R. 113, 118-19). See State v. Serv, 758 P.2d
935, 938 (Utah App. 1988)(holding that the general rule, that pre-plea
3

conditional plea agreement, defendant moved the trial court to
reconsider its ruling on the roadblock motion ("Reconsideration
Motion"), arguing that the trial court had erroneously applied
the federal good faith exception and that no good faith exception
exists under the Utah Constitution (R. 135-152).

The trial court

denied the reconsideration motion (R. 153-54, attached at
Addendum C). On March 14, 1996, the trial court sentenced
defendant to the statutory term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison (R. 218-19).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal

directed both to the trial court's denial of the roadblock
portion of her motion to suppress and the denial of her motion
for reconsideration (R. 221-32).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In connection with an application and authorization for an
administrative traffic checkpoint ("Plan," Supplemental Record,
"SR." 1-39, attached at Addendum D), the Utah County Attorney's
Office filed a checkpoint policy of the Utah County Sheriff's
Department, outlining general procedures for conducting the
checkpoint (See "Roadblocks/Checkpoints," Supplemental Record,
"SR." 09-15).

Specifically, the procedures contemplated that a

checkpoint plan would be submitted to a magistrate by a command

claims of error, including constitutional claims, are preserved jj[ the
plea entered by defendant,, consented to by the prosecutor, and
accepted by the trial court specifically preserves the claim for
appeal).
4

level officer (SR. 13-14).

The checkpoint would be staffed by at

least three deputies, at least one of whom would be a sergeant
who would brief and debrief the other deputies on their
conducting the checkpoint (SR. 12). Each checkpoint would
utilize safety equipment, including directive signs, flares,
cones and lighting equipment (SR. 11). Contact between deputies
and motorists would be done in a professional manner, in which
the deputy would advise the motorist of the purpose of the
checkpoint, request the motorist's driver's license and
registration, and observe the occupants for signs of intoxication
or other criminal activity "in plain view" (SR. 10). If all
documents appeared in order and there was no suspicion of
criminality, the vehicle would be directed through the checkpoint
(SR. 10). If a search or arrest were necessary, the driver would
be directed for investigation out of the flow of traffic (SR.
10).

If traffic backed up more than five minutes or caused a

safety hazard, it would be directed through the checkpoint with
only obvious violators being detained, until the delay or safety
hazard had been minimized (SR. 09).
On June 12, 1992, Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah
County Sheriff's Department, a patrol commander, signed an
affidavit in support of an administrative traffic checkpoint at
site #9, SR 144, the Tibbie Fork area (SR. 34). The affidavit
stated that based on the opinions of Lt. Turner and other

5

experienced members of the sheriff's office, Tibbie Fork was a
problem area, amenable to a traffic checkpoint conducted in
strict compliance with the checkpoint policy, with particular
attention to motorist safety (SR. 32-34).
Original Authorized Plan:

On June 15, 1992, pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (Supp. 1992)("Checkpoint Statute"),
the Utah County Attorney's Office submitted the plan for an
administrative traffic checkpoint on SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon
(SR. 1-39), effective from June 15 through September 30, 1992
between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. (SR. 38-39).

Under the plan, all

traffic was to be stopped, but if delays exceeded five minutes,
all traffic would be waived through the checkpoint until
additional assistance arrived (SR. 38). The purposes of the
checkpoint were as generally set out in the checkpoint policy,
attached to the plan, but further included inspections for
insurance cards, seatbelt and child restraint requirements, the
operation of lights and other required exterior safety devices,
and other "apparent" criminal activity (R. 38). 2 Additional
instructions required deputies to be familiar and comply with the
checkpoint policy, directed deputies to deal courteously with
motorists, detaining them for only one minute unless there was

2

"Checkpoint Briefing Instructions," also were incorporated by
reference into the plan, indicating that an additional purpose of the
stop was to use, if available, a trained dog to conduct an exterior
examination for controlled substances (SR. 26).
6

reasonable suspicion of an offense (SR. 26, 38-38).

The plan

also included public notice of the checkpoint at Tibbie Fork,
beginning May 1, 1992, announced in the Daily Herald, a Utah
County daily newspaper (SR. 07-08, 37). The plan further named
ninety-six law enforcement officers authorized to participate in
a checkpoint (SR. 19-20).

Lastly, the plan summarized how the

period of the stop, the degree of intrusion, any fear and anxiety
experienced by the motorist, and the degree of the deputy's
discretion in operating the checkpoint would be minimized and the
motorist's safety maximized (SR. 36). Fourth Circuit Court Judge
Lynn Davis, acting as magistrate, made lengthy findings noting
the conformity of the plan to the statutory requirements,
attached to the plan (SR. 1-6) and thereby authorized the plan
("Findings," SR. 40-52, attached at Addendum E ) .
First Authorized Plan:

On August 31, 1992 the Fourth

Circuit Court authorized an amendment to the plan, extending it
from September 1, 1992 to November 30, 1992, between 2:00 p.m.
and 2:30 a.m., and adding eight officers of the Department of
Wildlife Resources to the previous roster (SR. 53-57).

Over the

next two and one-half years, an authorized plan was similarly
extended and cumulatively amended, as shown:
Date of
Authorization

Period and Conditions
of Extensions

12/2/92
(2nd Extension)

12/1/92 to 2/28/93; 12:30 p.m. to
a.m.; 7 named Utah Highway
Patrol Officers added (SR. 58-62);
7

5/26/93
(3rd Extension)

6/1/93 to 8/31/93; 3 named U.S. Forest
Service Officers added (SR. 63-67);

7/7/94
(4th Extension)

8/31/94 to 8/31/95; 5 named Utah
Highway Patrol Officers, 1 named U.S.
Forest Service Officer, and 1 named
U.S.Park Service Officer, added (SR. 6873);

5/26/95
(5th Extension)

5/26/95 to 8/31/96; all sworn and
certified law enforcement officers of
enumerated State and Federal agencies
added (SR. 74-79).3

Each amended authorization indicated that the court had
examined the original application for each checkpoint along with
the requested amendments in considering each amended application,
and that the requested amendments were incorporated into the
original authorization issued by the court (SR. 53-54, 58-59, 63,
68, 74) .
Stop of Defendant:

At about 6:35 p.m., on July 16, 1995,

Deputy Utah County Sheriff Owen Shiverdecker, stopped the car
defendant was driving at the judicially approved Tibbie Fork
checkpoint.

Defendant had no valid driver's license and was

operating an unregistered car.

One of passengers was found to

have an outstanding warrant and was arrested.

Because there were

no other passengers who could legally drive the car, it was
impounded (R. 48-49, 101-02, 109-10, 249-50).
3

The referenced State and Federal agencies were: Utah County
Sheriff's Office, Utah Highway Patrol, Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources, U.S. Forest Service, and Utah State Parks and Recreation
(SR. 78).

8

Deputy Shiverdecker asked defendant to exit the car, at
which time he noticed that she was very angry and upset (R. 48,
251).

The Tibbie Fork area is remote (R. 251). Realizing that

defendant and her friends would be waiting unsupervised until a
ride was available, the deputy asked defendant if she had any
weapons (R. 48, 251) . Defendant said she did not have a knife,
which made Deputy Shiverdecker even more concerned for his safety
and led him to conduct a Terry frisk, leading to the discovery of
methamphetamine on defendant's person (R. 48, 109, 251-253, 261).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

This court need not reach the issue of the

constitutionality of the checkpoint statute because the State
does not challenge the trial court's finding that the plan in
this case did not comply with the requirements of the statute and
therefore the checkpoint was unconstitutional.

The State,

instead, relies on the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the
officers acted in good faith in relying on the previously secured
judicial authorization.

For this reason, it is unnecessary for

this Court — as it was for the trial court — to determine the
constitutionality of the statute.

The only issue to be resolved

is whether the trial court properly determined that the officers
acted in good faith.
POINT II: The trial court properly applied the good faith
exception to this case.

The officer's good faith reliance on the
9

checkpoint plan is evident in this case—the initial plan, based
on a statute specifically designed to correct constitutional
deficiencies in roadblocks, provided for each criterion of the
statute, was approved by a circuit court judge who made lengthy
findings in support, including approval of those specific
provisions later found out of compliance with the statute and was
repeatedly re-approved by various magistrates.
POINT III: Utah courts have consistently refused to interpret
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently than
the federal constitution, except when federal law is either
unclear, unsettled, or based on unsound policy.

The Leon good

faith exception, followed by all federal and the majority of
state jurisdictions, recognizes that while the limited purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the rule's
objective is not achieved if evidence is suppressed when officers
rely in good faith on a judge's prior authorization of their
objectively reasonable conduct.

Defendant's extensive reliance

on some states' rejection of Leon is counterbalanced by the many
other states which have adopted the exception as sound policy.
Because defendant has failed to show a sound basis to reject the
good faith exception, an exception which serves the public policy
of admitting inherently trustworthy evidence while promoting the
constitutionally favored warrants approach, this Court should
refuse to depart from the federal standard in this case.

10

POINT I
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE CHECKPOINT
PLAN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE, IT
IS UNNECESSARY TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE.
As in the trial court, defendant on appeal claims that the
checkpoint statute violates both the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

Appellant's Br. at 9-17.

However, under well-

established law, the Court should decline to reach defendant's
claims.

See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1991),

petition for cert, dismissed as improvidently granted, 881 P.2d
840 (Utah 1994) (noting that the appellate court should avoid
addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so); 4
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a
fundamental rule that [the Supreme Court] should avoid addressing
constitutional issues unless required to do so."); State v.
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1996)("Utah courts have
consistently refused to reach the constitutionality of a statute
4

In Sims, this Court found it inappropriate to simply accept
the State's invitation to assume that the roadblock, unauthorized by
statute, was unconstitutional, and therefore addressed the legality of
roadblock under the state constitution. Id. at 144, 147-50. Sims,
however, was substantially different from this case. In Sims, unlike
this case, the trial court found that the roadblock was constitutional
under both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 143. Thus,
the trial court's ruling denying suppression under the state
constitution was squarely before this Court on appeal. Id. See also
State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah App. 1991)(addressing
defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of a roadblock
because "the constitutionality question was the precise basis of the
trial court's ruling").
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when there are other independent grounds to resolve the case.");
State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.)(per
curiam)(declining to address whether roadblock violated the
defendant's state constitutional rights because the roadblock did
not pass muster under the federal constitution), cert, denied,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
In this case the trial court expressly concluded that the
checkpoint plan unconstitutionally failed to comply with the
checkpoint statute under the Fourth Amendment, but that evidence
should not be suppressed under the good faith exception (R. 107).
On appeal, the State does challenge the court's ruling on the
plan's unconstitutional noncompliance with the statute.

The

issue of good faith is independent of the statute's
constitutionality and determines the outcome of the case.
Therefore, because this Court must decide the good faith issue in
order to resolve this case, and because no decision on the
constitutionality of the statute can resolve the case without a
decision on the good faith issue, this Court should decline to
consider the merits of defendant's challenges to the
constitutionality of the checkpoint statute.5

5

If this Court, nonetheless, determines that resolution of this
issue is necessary to the outcome of this case, the State specifically
requests the opportunity to supplementally brief the issue.
12

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT OFFICERS ACTED
IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE
CHECKPOINT PLAN.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding
that, although the plan failed to comply with the checkpoint
statute, the evidence found during the search should not be
suppressed under the good faith exception to the federal
exclusionary rule where officers have relied on a plan approved
by a magistrate (R. 108-07).

Specifically, defendant claims (1)

that the trial court's reliance on United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984), is misplaced because Leon good faith applies
only to warrants presumptively issued on probable cause rather
than plans approved by magistrates, (2) that the extended good
faith exception under Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987),
does not apply because Krull concerned good faith based on a
statute subsequently declared unconstitutional, rather than
officers' improper implementation of the plan, and (3) that local
law enforcement officers and prosecutors did not act in good
faith in drafting and pursuing a plan that so deviated from the
requirements of the checkpoint statute and the constitutional
requirements of Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 4 96 U.S.
444 (1990).

Appellant's Br. at 17-27.

Defendant's claims are without merit.

The first claim urges

an insignificant distinction in the face of the central tenet of
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the good faith exception, to wit: good faith applies where
officers objectively and reasonably rely on judicial approval of
their intended actions.
court's ruling.

The second claim mistakes the trial

The third claim is unsupported by a record that

shows officers reasonably relied on a judge's approval of a plan
that substantially conformed to the checkpoint statute.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Recognized that the Federal
Good Faith Exception Applied in this Case.

The trial court found that although the plan did not comply
with the checkpoint statute, officers had acted in good faith
under the Fourth Amendment by relying on the circuit court
judge's approval of the plan, citing Leon in support.
Under the Fourth Amendment "[e]vidence obtained by officers
acting in good faith, objectively and reasonably relying on a
search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, need
not be excluded even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated
by a lack of probable cause."

State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 711

(Utah App.)(citing United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984)), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).

Defendant

asserts that because the Leon good faith exception is directed to
an officer's good faith reliance on a warrant, good faith does
not apply to a case not involving a warrant, i.e., an instance in
which a search or seizure is authorized on less than probable
cause.

Appellant's Br. at 18-20.

Defendant's view misapprehends

the essence of the Leon good faith exception.
14

Under Leon, suppression applies only in those cases in which
exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.
Leon, 4 68 U.S. at 918. The rule "cannot be expected, and should
not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement
activity."

Ici. at 919.

"This is particularly true . . . when an

officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope
. . . . Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error,
rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations."

Id. at 921.

While Leon expressly limited that decision to the good faith
execution of judicially authorized searches only, its rationale
has been more fully developed in Illinois v. Krull.

In Krull,

the Court found that a detective acted in good faith reliance on
a statute authorizing an administrative search of the records and
property of car and parts dealers even if the statute was
subsequently found unconstitutional.

Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-55.

There was no question that the administrative search was
statutorily authorized without reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct, probable cause, or exigent circumstances.
43.

Id. at 342-

Nonetheless, the Court found that
[t]he approach used in Leon is equally applicable
to the present case. The application of the
exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an
officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a
statute would have as little deterrent effect on the
officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence
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when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance
on a warrant.
Id. at 349.

The Court emphasized its point, stating:

"Indeed,

the possibility of a deterrent effect may be even less when the
officer acts pursuant to a statute rather than a warrant."
at 350 n.7.

Id.

See also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah

1995)(affirming court of appeals' view that the officers were
entitled to rely in good faith on the county ordinance not yet
declared unconstitutional, and relying on Krull).
It is apparent from Krull and Chapman that the federal good
faith exception is not tied only to searches and seizures
presumptively supported by sufficient probable cause to justify a
warrant.

The hallmark of good faith is reasonable reliance on

the magistrate's authorization.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 922

("MA]

warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish'
that a law enforcement officer has *acted in good faith in
conducting the search.'")(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 823 n.32 (1982)); cf. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185
(Utah 1987)(recognizing that "[Leon's] foundation is that
excluding illegally-seized evidence when a police officer has
received authorization to conduct a search, has restricted his
search to the boundaries of his authorization, and has a
reasonable basis for relying on the authorization would defeat
the ends of justice," but declining to apply Leon because there
was "no outside authority on which the officers could reasonably
16

rely [that] expressly authorized the search").

In this case, law

enforcement received authorization for a checkpoint plan from a
circuit court judge.

In accord with Krull and Chapman, the

trial court correctly noted that
this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search
warrant. There is a presumption, as stated above, that
when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been
reviewed and issued by a neutral magistrate he is
acting in good faith which precludes the evidence from
being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where
the plan for the roadblock was submitted to and
approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to
rely upon such approval in good faith and therefore the
evidence should not be suppressed because of the good
faith exception.
(R. 107). Therefore, the court correctly applied the Leon good
faith exception, as extended by Krull, and recognized in Chapman.
B.

The Trial Court's Ruling is Supported by Illinois v.
Krull.

Defendant somewhat ambiguously argues that because the Utah
County Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office
prepared and followed a plan which the trial court found did not
comply with the checkpoint statute, but was not determined to be
unconstitutional, good faith reliance by law enforcement is not
supported by Krull, in which a detective acted in good faith,
albeit in compliance with a statute that was subsequently found
unconstitutional.

Appellant's Br. at 20-21.

To the extent this argument focuses on the subsequent
determination of the constitutionality of a statute, the
distinction is irrelevant to a determination of good faith, which
17

is ultimately based on the officer's actions and to whom the
exclusionary rule is directed in a given case.

See Commonwealth,

Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Blosenski Disposal Serv., 532 A.2d
497, 499 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)(search of the defendant's transfer
station by employee of regulatory agency acting in reliance on
statute upheld without clear determination of statute's
constitutionality), aff'd, 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989).

To the

extent this argument asserts that the good faith exception does
not apply when law enforcement does not comply with a plan, Krull
is still supporting authority.

In Krull, the Court noted that

the good faith exception might not apply if an officer
erroneously, although in good faith, acted outside the scope of a
statute.

Krull, 480 U.S. at 360 n.17.

Use' of the exclusionary

rule "depends significantly upon the actors who are making the
relevant decision that the rule is designed to influence."

Id.

If, as in Krull, officers in this case had been acting
directly on statutory directives, or on guidelines not approved
by a neutral magistrate, the Court's dictum in Krull might apply,
thus limiting the application of the good faith exception in this
case.

However, the checkpoint plan was submitted to a neutral

magistrate.

Thus, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the

relevant decision maker is not law enforcement, but the
magistrate, and the exclusionary rule should not apply against
officers who reasonably rely on the magistrate's authorization.
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Cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 360 n.17 (where officers search pursuant
to statute without judicial oversight, noting that if officers
act outside the scope of the statute then they, and not
legislators or magistrates, are the relevant actors and therefore
proper targets of the exclusionary rule).

In sum, Krull, in

connection with Leon, supports the trial court's application of
the good faith exception.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Law
Enforcement Acted with Good Faith.

Defendant argues that the failure of law enforcement,
including the Utah County Attorney's Office, which drafted the
checkpoint application, to design a plan that followed the
checkpoint statute's "simple, unambiguous checklist format" and
the requirements of Sitz, precludes a finding of good faith.
Appellant's Br. at 21-27.

In making this argument, defendant

neglects to mention the variety of factors supporting a finding
of good faith, to wit: the plan's substantial compliance with the
statute, notwithstanding its noncompliance in certain respects;
the reasonable limits on what a deputy police officer should know
of constitutional law; and most significantly, the deputy's
reliance on the circuit courts' repeated approvals of the plan.
"There is a presumption that when an officer relies upon a
warrant, the officer is acting in good faith."

Horton, 848 P.2d

at 711 (citing United States v. Cardall. 773 F.2d 1128, 1133
(10th Cir. 1985)).

Notwithstanding this presumption, the burden

is ultimately on the State to prove that its agents' reliance on
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the warrant was objectively reasonable.
at 932.

Corral-Corral, 8 99 F.2d

"It is only when the officer's reliance on the warrant

is "wholly unwarranted1 that good faith is absent."

Horton, 848

P.2d at 711 (citing Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 939); accord
United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1990),
cert, denied. 500 U.S. 937 (1991).
In Leon, the Supreme Court identified four circumstances in
which an officer could not manifest objective good faith.
Analogizing to Leon, only one of those circumstances is asserted
by defendant in this case, to wit: "depending on the
circumstances of the particular case, [the plan is] so facially
deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

In this case,

Deputy Shiverdecker1s reliance on the judicially authorized plan,
especially since he was specifically named in the original 1992
plan, was objectively reasonable, notwithstanding the plan's
partial noncompliance with the checkpoint statute.

2.

The Plan, Though Deficient in Some Respects,
Substantially
Complied with Statutory
Requirements.

Section 77-23-104, on which the plan was drafted, identified
eight criteria that a command level officer must address in
submitting a plan for approval to a magistrate, to wit: (i)
location; (ii) date, time and duration; (iii) sequence of traffic
stopped; (iv) purpose; (v) names of personnel; (vi) location of
safety signs; (vii) advance notice; and (viii) instructions to
officers.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (2) (a) (1995).
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The initial plan under which Deputy Shiverdecker operated
addressed each of these categories: (i) the location of
checkpoint was specifically identified as SR 144 in Tibbie Fork
Canyon, approximately one mile from the junction with SR 92 in
American Fork Canyon (SR. 39), and was supported by a description
of the road and surrounding area, a diagram of the road showing
directional signs, and a geological survey map of the area (SR.
28, 30, 39); (ii) the date, time and duration of the checkpoint
were stated (SR. 38); (iii) the plan indicated that all traffic
would be stopped, but that traffic would be directed through the
checkpoint if it was delayed more than five minutes (SR. 38);
(iv) the purposes of the plan were clearly indicated—to inspect
license plates, registration certificates, and insurance cards,
to inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraints, to
inquire if drivers had been drinking or were impaired, to visibly
inspect the operation of required light and other required
exterior safety devices, and to inspect for other apparent
criminal activity (SR. 26, 38); (v) a patrol sergeant from the
list of specifically named Utah County law enforcement personnel
was designated as the command level deputy and charged with
maintaining statistical information (SR. 19-20, 38); (vi) a
diagram and series of photographs depicted the type, arrangement,
spacing and location of signs on the site (SR. 17, 30, 37); (vii)
evidence of public notice was given of the checkpoint (SR. 8,
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37); and (viii) deputies were also supplied with "Checkpoint
Briefing Instructions," restating the sequence of traffic to be
checked and the purposes of the checkpoint.

The instructions

also directed those manning the checkpoint to review the Utah
County Sheriff's Department's policies and procedures regarding
checkpoints, to act courteously during contact with drivers, and
to limit the inspection to no more than one minute unless
reasonable suspicion of an offense developed.

Any deviation from

from the checkpoint policy required supervisory approval (SR. 915, 26, 37).
In accordance with the statute, the initial plan also
summarized how the intrusion of a stop would be minimized: (i)
delays would be limited to five minutes; (ii) further delays
could be justified only by reasonable suspicion or probable cause
of criminal activity; (iii) advance public notice and checkpoint
warning signs would minimize a motorist's fear and anxiety; (iv)
the discretion any officer could exercise would be minimized by
adherence to the checkpoint policy and specific instructions
given on site; and (v) motorists' safety would be maximized
through configuration and placement of warning signs, barricades
and traffic cones, and officer safety through reflective vests
and flashlight cones (R. 36). 6
6

Additionally, Lieutenant Turner's affidavit further expanded
on the safety considerations of the plan, stating (1) his long
experience in conducting administrative traffic checkpoints, (2)
factors indicating that the Tibbie Fork area was particularly amenable
22

Additionally, a copy of the checkpoint policy was attached
to the plan (SR, 9-14).

The policy further elaborated on the

implementation of a checkpoint, including the debriefing and
critiquing of deputies, the gathering of arrest and citation
data, the completion of incident reports, and the listing of
additional traffic control and safety measures (SR, 9-12).

Most

especially, the policy fully set out the statutory requirements
for the checkpoint (SR. 12-14), followed by the measures for
implementing the policy referenced above (SR. 9-12).
Fourth Circuit Court Judge Lynn Davis W. Davis reviewed the
initial 1992 plan and made detailed, extensive findings
supporting its approval (SR. 40-48).

Prefacing its findings, the

court first noted
[t]he only issue before the court is whether the
authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue of
compliance with House Bill 259. The constitutionality
of administrative checkpoints under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article
I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution is not at issue.
The application is supported with over 20 pages of
exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House
Bill No. 259, the Administrative Checkpoint Act.
(SR. 48). Thereafter, the court made seven pages of detailed
findings addressing the manner in which the plan implemented each
subsection of the statute (SR. 41-47), ultimately concluding that
to establishing a checkpoint, (3) restraint in conducting the
checkpoint during icy or snowy conditions, (4) additional traffic
control measures, including the making of a video, (5) a permanent
site record generated from debriefing plans, and (6) reliance on the
Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident Specialist who had
examined the site and confirmed that the plan was safe (SR. 32-34).
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"the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as required
by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the Act
and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance
with the plan may issue" (SR. 40). Based on this conclusion, the
circuit ourt issued an order (see Order Authorizing
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint, SR. 49-52, attached at
Addendum F), whose form and substance again tracked the statutory
requirements, item by item.
Although the trial court found that the plan did not comply
with the statute, Officer Shiverdecker could reasonably have
believed otherwise, based on Judge Davis's findings, especially
since Judge Davis approved both the initial plan and the amended
application authorizing the plan under which defendant was
stopped, thus giving his amended authorization an expanded
perspective.

Relevant to the trial court's later determination

of noncompliance, Judge Davis made the following findings: (1)
the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint was adequately
described, and that "[t]here is nothing in the Act which would
appear to preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority" (SR.
46-47); (2) "the purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or
inquiry to be conducted," especially as supplemented by Exhibit C
to the plan (see "Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, SR. 25-26),
"are adequately and reasonably identified in . . . the
application (SR. 46); and (3) that in spite of the unusually

24

large pool of participating personnel, necessitated by the
duration of the checkpoint, and in spite of the exactitude in
naming personnel seemingly required by section 77-23104(2)(b)(v), "it certainly does not appear that a pool of names
as provided herein would be necessarily precluded" (SR. 45-46).
In further support of compliance, the court noted that the pool
of named deputies served judicial economy by limiting the number
of checkpoint applications, and the realities of law enforcement
which often require the substitution of deputies for a given task
(SR. 45). The court concluded: "The critical concern of this
court is that trained, uniformed officers, conduct the checkpoint
according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol
sergeant be present who is in charge" (SR. 45).
Based on Judge Davis's deliberate consideration and explicit
recognition of compliance, albeit a determination subsequently
disagreed with by the trial court, Deputy Shiverdecker was
reasonably entitled to rely on the plan.

See Leon, 468 U.S. at

926 (holding that an officer's reliance on the magistrate's
determination of probable cause was reasonable where the
affidavit provided enough evidence "to create disagreement among
thoughtful and competent judges").

As Judge Davis noted, the

statute did not specifically limit the duration of the checkpoint
(SR. 46-47).

Further, the statute does not require the trial

court to determine whether the purposes of the checkpoint lie
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within the ambit of the statute, but only that they be stated.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv), -104(2)(b) (Supp. 1992).
Also, although the last amendment to the application no longer
specifically named the personnel who would operate the
checkpoint, Deputy Shiverdecker would not reasonably have been
concerned with this omission since each subsequent authorization
explicitly incorporated the initial plan, in which he was
specifically named (SR. 19). 7 In sum, the plan was plainly not
so facially deficient that Deputy Shiverdecker could have
presumed it to be invalid, and Deputy Shiverdecker was entitled
to rely on it.
"*[A] warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to
establish' that a law enforcement officer has *acted in good
faith in conducting the search.'"
(citation omitted).

See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922

Cf. State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289,

294 (Utah 1995)(suggesting that consent to warrantless search
would have been attenuated from illegal roadblock stop if
officers had, in the face of roadblock's uncertain legality,
sought prior judicial approval).

Over the next three years,

judicial authorization for extension of the original plan's
7

Although the State acknowledges that at the time defendant was
stopped the statute required that personnel operating the checkpoint
be identified by name, the legislature subsequently amended section
77-23-104(2)(a)(v) to require only the "minimum number of personnel to
be employed in operating the checkpoint." 1997 Utah Laws ch. 284, §
1. The amended statute evidently reflects Judge Davisfs
earlier
recognition that the realities of law enforcement made the precise
naming of personnel impractical.
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duration and amendment of the personnel operating under the plan
was sought and received five times (SR. 53-79).

Each application

specifically indicated that the requested amendment was based on
the existing plan (SR. 57, 62, 67, 73, 79). Each resulting
authorization stated that the court had examined the original
application, that the amendment was incorporated into the
original authorization, and that the amended application and
authorization was to be placed in a file with the original
application and authorization (SR. 53-54, 58-59, 63, 68, 74) .
Thus, officers had repeated approval by multiple circuit court
judges for reauthorization of the checkpoint, a circumstance that
could only have made them feel entirely confident that they were
acting in good faith under the plan.8
Citing Leon, defendant argues that good faith is especially
8

Moreover, to the extent Deputy Shiverdecker might be required
to assess the constitutionality of the plan after it had been
judicially authorized, he was entitled to rely on Judge Davis's
findings, which specifically stated that the "constitutionality of
administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution is
not at issue" (SR. 48). See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451-52) ("The
enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers
concerning its constitutionality . . . . " ) . The plan conformed to a
statute which was drafted in evident response to this Court's
overturning unauthorized roadblocks and the United States Supreme
Court's upholding of a statutorily authorized roadblock in Sitz. (See
House debate on H.B. Bill 259 enacting, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101, 105 (Supp. 1992). H.B. 259, 49th Leg., 1992 Utah Laws ch. 72, attached
at Addendum G). Defendant cites no authority that an officer could
not in objective good faith rely on an authorizing court's direct
pronouncement of the law. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard. 468 U.S.
981, 989-90 (1984)("[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to
disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action,
that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he
has requested.").
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inapplicable in this case because the application was drafted by
the Utah County Attorney's Office, which, along with police
officers, should have known that the plan did not comply with the
statute or the requirements of Sitz.
24-25.

Appellant's Br. at 21-22,

See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 ("The objective standard

we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable
knowledge of what the law prohibits.").

Defendant's argument

misses the prime focus of the good faith exception.
"The Court has stressed that the *prime purpose' of the
exclusionary rule *is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Krull, 480 at 347 (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).

Generally,

law enforcement is perceived to have acted in good faith when it
relies on government attorneys to draft or review affidavits in
support of search warrants.

Indeed, this was precisely the

circumstance in Leon, where the investigating officer's extensive
application was reviewed by several deputy district attorneys.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 902; see United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d
366, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1993)(officer who drafted affidavit and
sought advice from county attorneys concerning its substantive
completeness before submitting it to the magistrate relied in
good faith on a warrant later found lacking probable cause);
United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1430-32 (9th Cir.
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1988)(finding critical to its determination that government
agents acted in good faith in a close case where an assistant
U.S. Attorney drafted and approved defective warrant provisions);
United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1985)(same).
In sum, based on the plan's substantive tracking of and
substantial compliance with the statute, Judge Davis's lengthy
findings supporting the authorization of the plan (including
express approval of those provisions of the plan subsequently
found noncompliant by the trial court), Judge Davis's statement
that the constitutionality of the statute was not at issue, the
statute's and the plan's presumptive constitutionality, law
enforcement's reliance on the Utah County Attorney to draft the
original application and subsequent amendments, and multiple
circuit court judges' continued reauthorizations of the plan, law
enforcement officers objectively and reasonably relied on the
plan in stopping defendant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPLICITLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED
TO ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED REASON TO CONSIDER AN
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND
TO THEREBY REJECT THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION.
In apparent belief that the trial court found that the plan
was also unconstitutional under the state constitution, defendant
argues that the Utah Supreme Court has not recognized, nor should
it now recognize, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
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of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution,9
Br. at 27.

Appellant's

The argument is tantamount to seeking a total

rejection of the good faith exception, an untenable claim as
explained below.
The trial court concluded that law enforcement officers
acted under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule only (R. 107, 154). Consistent with the Watts
line of cases, the trial court implicitly concluded that
defendant failed to articulate a policy-based reason to depart
from federal law and, thus, properly refused to construe a good
faith exception to the state exclusionary rule different from the
federal good faith exception.10
A.

The Watts Standard for Interpreting Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in Light of
Fourth Amendment.

Traditionally, Utah courts, in applying article I, section
14 to warrantless automobile searches, have followed United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985).

As

explained below, this Court should continue to follow the LeonKrull good faith exception because the narrow criteria for

9

See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991)(noting
that the court had not yet decided whether there was a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution).
10

Alternatively, the court felt that defendant's briefing of the
issue was inadequate and refused to reach the issue.
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departing from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence articulated
by this Court in State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), are
not present in the context of the good faith exception.
In Watts, the Utah Supreme Court articulated its position on
the issue of how article I, section 14 should be interpreted in
light of the Fourth Amendment:
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
reads nearly verbatim with the [F]ourth [A]mendment,
and thus this Court had never drawn any distinctions
between the protections afforded by the respective
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court has
always considered the protections afforded to be one
and the same.
Watts 750 P.2d at 1221; see also State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120
(Utah 1976) (construing article I, section 14 as providing the
same scope of protection as the Fourth Amendment); State v.
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968)(same); State v.
Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844 (1968)(same), superseded bv
statute as stated in State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984).
Recognizing its disinclination to interpret article I,
section 14 differently than the federal constitution, the state
supreme court identified a narrow basis for departing from Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, to wit: to "insulat[e] this state's
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given
the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Watts, 750 P.2d at
1221 n.8 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Utah courts have

departed from federal search and seizure law only in limited
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settings where the United States Supreme Court has inexplicably
decided cases in a way fundamentally at odds with wellestablished law.

See, e.g., Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-19

(rejecting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), because
its "standing" analysis was driven by notions of property rights
instead of the traditional "expectation of privacy" test for
determining Fourth Amendment standing enunciated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511-12
(1967)); Sims, 808 P.2d at 149 (rejecting Sitz, because the court
upheld a suspicionless "sobriety checkpoint" based on a interest
balancing analysis where balancing of interests must first be
completed by the state legislature, not law enforcement); State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 464-70, 473 (Utah 1990)(Chief Justice
Zimmerman and Justice Durham only concluding automobile warrant
exception was confused and conflicting under federal law). n

In

contrast to Thompson, Sims, and Larocco, Utah courts have
consistently refused to interpret article I, section 14
differently than the fourth amendment in cases where the federal
standard is clear and well-settled.

See, e.g.,; State v.

Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 548-50 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that
article I, section 14, rather than federal law, was to be applied
11

See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1239 & 1241 (Utah
1996) (disagreeing on analytical approach but concurring in result
that automobile exception is the same under state and federal
constitutions); Sims, 841 P.2d at 15-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in
result) (Larocco state constitutional analysis "did not represent the
views of a majority of this Court" ); .
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"for the primary purpose of shielding Utah citizens *from the
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the [F]ourth
[A]mendment by the federal courts'")(quoting Watts, 750 P.2d at
1221 n.8); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111-12 (Utah App.
1994)(refusing to adopt knowing waiver standard for consensual
searches under state constitution instead of well- established
Fourth Amendment voluntariness test for determining validity of
consent to search), cert, denied., 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
The Watts exception strikes an appropriate balance between
the need to ensure that citizen rights are adequately protected
and the desire to have a uniform statement of law to govern
police conduct.

It does not indicate that departure is proper

simply because some standard other than that adopted by the
United States Supreme Court might be considered more desirable in
certain settings.12 Nor does it sanction departures from federal
law based on mere perceived inconsistencies between various
supreme court opinions.

Only when the federal law on a

particular issue has become so confused or ill-advised that it
provides no guidance to law enforcement, thereby imperiling the
rights of Utah citizens, should article I, section 14 be

12

See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (finding it "'inappropriate for this Court to use Article
I, Section 14, the Utah unreasonable search and seizure provision, to
attempt to *fine tune' federal constitutional search and seizure law"
and opining disagreement with a particular federal search and seizure
opinion "does not justify resorting to Article I, Section 14 to
achieve a different result").
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interpreted differently than the fourth amendment.
B.

Neither Policy Nor Confusion in the Law Governing
the Good Faith Exception Justifies a Departure
from Federal Standards.

Defendant does not assert that federal law applying the Leon
good faith exception is confused or inconsistent, but rather that
this Court should refuse to find a state good faith exception to
the state exclusionary rule.

Defendant founds his argument on

policy reasons expressed by the dissents in Leon and Krull, and
other states which resort to their respective state constitutions
to prohibit a good faith exception to their exclusionary rules.
However, because there is no confusion in how the federal good
faith exception may be applied in the circumstances of this case/
and because none of defendant's arguments sufficiently undermine;
the sound policies underlying the federal good faith exception,
this Court should not depart from federal Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and positively determine that Utah lacks a good
faith exception to the state exclusionary rule.

See Jackson, 937

P.2d at 548-50 (refusing to find a reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's garbage, set out for collection on the street,
under article I, section 14, notwithstanding defendant's
substantial briefing of state constitutional application, where
federal law was "clear, sensible, and uniform").

Indeed, this

Court, as an intermediate court of appeals, is not even the
proper forum to decide whether Utah lacks a good faith exception
comparable to the federal exception, see id. at 550
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(acknowledging that the Utah Supreme Court is the appropriate
forum in which to fashion a state constitutional rule different
from the federal rule)(citations omitted), especially when the
Utah Supreme Court has already hesitated to decide the status of
a state good faith exception.
1.

The Basic

Policies

See Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419.

Underlying

Leon are

Sound.

The Leon good faith exception derives from the limitations
of the exclusionary rule and the cost of losing inherently good
evidence.

The Leon majority first noted that "[t]he Fourth

Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of
evidence obtained in violation of its commands."
at 906.

Leon, 4 68 U.S.

"[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to

*cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered.'"

Id. (citations omitted).

"The rule thus operates as

*a judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
"Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed
in a particular case . . . must be resolved by weighing the costs
and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in
chief of inherently trustworthy evidence . . . "

Id. at 906-07.

The Court then identified the substantial costs of "unbending
application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of
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governmental rectitude," to wit: unacceptable impedance of the
truth-finding functions of the judge and jury, release of guilty
persons and reductions in sentences as a result of favorable plea
bargains, offense to basic concepts of criminal justice, and the
possible generation of disrespect for the law and the
administration of justice."

Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted).

In support of these adverse consequences, the Court relied on
research estimating that as a result of the exclusionary rule
"the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or nonconviction of
individuals arrested on felony drugs charges is probably in the
range of 2.8% to 1.1%."

Id. at 907 n.6.

Having recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
was to deter illegal conduct, the Court, however, also recognized
that for various reasons the rule could not have a significant
deterrent effect in the warrant issuing process, to wit: (1) "the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather
than to punish judges and magistrates," (2) "there exists no
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among
these actors requires the application of the extreme sanction of
exclusion, and (3) since "judges and magistrates are not adjuncts
to the law enforcement team," but "rather neutral judicial
officers [who] have no stake in the outcome of particular
criminal prosecutions, [t]he threat of exclusion . . . cannot be
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expected to significantly deter them."

Id. at 916-17.

Thus, the

Court reasoned, if the exclusionary rule was to have any
deterrent effect, it must alter the behavior of individual law
enforcement officers.

Id. at 918.

The court rejected as

speculative that limited application of the exclusionary rule
would result in "magistrate shopping" or encourage officers to
more closely scrutinize warrant applications, and that removal or
closer supervision of magistrates would be a more effective
remedy for a judge who "rubbered stamped" for the police than
exclusion.

Id. at 918, 918 n.18.

Finally, the Court limited any

erosion of the probable cause standard for warrants by placing
obvious limits on the good faith exception.13
The Leon good faith exception has prevailed against its
detractors for thirteen years.

In opposition to that opinion,

defendant cites the dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and
Stevens, first arguing that the exclusionary rule goes beyond
deterrence of police misconduct and properly reaches the courts
in their evidence-admitting function.

3

Appellant's Br. at 28.

Specifically, the Court noted four circumstances in which an
officer could not manifest objective good faith, to wit: (1) where the
judge or magistrate was "misled by information in an affidavit that
the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for
his reckless disregard of the truth," (2) "where the issuing
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role," (3) where the
affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its exercise entirely unreasonable," and (4)
warrant was "so facially deficient . . . that executing officers
[could] not reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at
923.
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However, the majority in Leon recognized that judicial
participation in a Fourth Amendment violation which might offend
the integrity of the courts results "is essentially the same as
the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent
purpose."

Leon. 468 U.S. at 921 n.22.

More importantly,

defendant fails to cite any Utah case for the proposition that
the state exclusionary rule is focused primarily on judicial
integrity, as opposed to police misconduct.

See State v.

Ziealeman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) ("'The prime
purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, 'is to
deter future unlawful police conduct'") (quoting United States v.
Janis. 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) .14
Relying again on Justice Brennan's dissent, defendant argues
that consistent exclusion would result in police officers'
performing with greater care, and that adopting a state good
faith exception would promote police ignorance, sloth, and
magistrate shopping.15

Appellant's Br. at 28-29.

The argument

14

See also Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 297 (Howe, J.,
dissenting)("'The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the
very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some
right.f")(citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1993)(quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring))).
15

But see State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 868 (N.J.
1987)(Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(noting in accord with Leon, that
unbending application of the rule may actually undermine the
motivation of law-enforcement officer to comply with probable cause
requirements, because xx[i]nstead of disciplining their employees,
police departments generally have adopted the attitude that the courts
cannot be satisfied, that the rules are hopelessly complicated and
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stands as a bare allegation, without any empirical support.
Relying on both Justices Brennan and Stevens, defendant
argues that, following the "relaxed" concept of probable cause
under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the good faith
exception requires the courts "to entertain the mind-boggling
concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively
unreasonable warrant."

Appellant's Br. at 29 (citing Leon, 468

U.S. at 958-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

However, it is plain

that courts too numerous to cite have not been overly befuddled
by the good faith exception, including Utah courts.16

More

importantly, Justice Brennan's criticism unfairly equates the
"unreasonableness" in a magistrate's inadequate determination of
probable cause for a warrant with the "unreasonableness" of a
police officer's conduct in relying on that warrant:

"^Surely

when this Court divides five to four on issues of probable cause,
it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was at fault or

subject to change, and that the suppression of evidence is the courts'
problem and not the departments.'")(citation omitted).
16

See. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995) ("A stop or
arrest made pursuant to an officer's good faith reliance on an
ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a
subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality.")(citing
Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50); Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 185-86 (finding
Leon inapplicable to unauthorized, warrantless automobile search);
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to apply good
faith exception under Leon, where detective "misled the magistrate by
including in the warrant affidavit information that he *knew was false
or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for
the truth'") (citation omitted); Horton, 848 P.2d at 711-13 (finding
good faith reliance where none of the four circumstances cited in Leon
for precluding good faith pertained).
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acted unreasonably in making the arrest.'"

Novembrino, 519 A.2d

at 869 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).

2.

The Rationales
Advanced
Not Justify
a Departure
Exception.

by Courts of Other States
from the Leon Good Faith

do

Notwithstanding the Leon dissents, the highest courts of at
least eight states,17 the intermediate appellate courts of four

17

See State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 526-28 (1984)(holding that the
state exclusionary rule should be applied no more broadly than the
federal rule, and recognizing Leon's limited application of the
exclusionary rule); People v. Camarella, 818 P.2d 63, 64, 70 (Cal.
1991) (clarifying application of Leon, and holding, "[b]y virtue of
California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d),"
which provides that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding," the application of the Leon good faith exception
is an issue "purely one of federal constitutional law")(citation
omitted); People v, Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.), cert, dismissed,
512 U.S. 1272 (1994)(statute providing that whenever evidence is
sought to be excluded based on the conduct of the officer, it will be
open to the proponent to show that it was taken in reasonable good
faith that it was proper); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla.
1988) (explaining that Florida adopted the Leon good faith exception
by virtue of a 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution providing
that the state search and seizure provision must be construed in
conformity with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment); Cravton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 688-89
(Ky. 1992) (noting similarity in language between Fourth Amendment and
parallel state constitutional provision and noting neither mentions
suppression as a remedy for a search or seizure violation; holding
application of good faith exception does not violate Section 10 of the
Kentucky Constitution); State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Mo. 1986)
(finding good faith exception applied with equal force under Missouri
Constitution, thus implicitly modifying Missouri's judicially created
exclusionary rule, which existed independent of the federal rule);
State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 826, 828 (S.D. 1988) (stating "the
analysis in Leon and its related case has properly refocused on the
purpose behind the exclusionary rule"; finding Leon "persuasive" and
adopting its reasoning under the South Dakota Constitution, art. VI, §
11); McCarv v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984) (embracing
"the recently announced *good faith' exception to the exclusionary
rule").
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other states,18 and the District of Columbia19 have embraced the
Leon good faith exception either by statute or under their state
constitutions.

Additionally, the highest courts of at least four

other states have applied the Leon good faith exception with
approval.20

Those courts have collectively recognized that,

notwithstanding their freedom to prescribe greater protection
under their state constitutions, the good faith exception
properly accounts for the cost of inherently trustworthy evidence
and accommodates the limited deterrent function of the
exclusionary rule without sacrificing public respect for the
criminal justice system or the probable cause standard.21

18

People v. Hieber, 629 N.E.2d 235, 236-38 (111. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that good faith adopted under prior case law and incorporated
into statute); Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting similarity of Article I, section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution to the Fourth Amendment and the parallel evolution of the
state and federal exclusionary rules and therefore finding no
compelling reason for rejecting the Leon good faith exception); State
v. Huber, 704 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting Leon good
faith exception under state constitutional provision identical to the
Fourth Amendment, though noting that court was still free to retain
stricter exclusionary rule); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 1984, 210 (La.
Ct. App. 1984)(adopting good faith exception under state constitution
for sound policy reasons while recognizing freedom to deviate from
federal decisions based on constitutional language distinctions and
independent state constitutional authority).
19

Lumpkin v. United States, 586 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C App. 1991).

20

Connelly v. State, 589 A.2d 958, 964-67 (Md. 1991); State v.
Kleinbera, 421 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Neb. 1988) (applying Leon and
concluding exclusionary rule was inappropriate to apply because it
"does not serve to deter the errors of judges but rather the errors of
police officers"); State v. Wilmoth, 490 N.E.2d 1236, 1246-48 (Ohio
1986); Hvde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 380 (Wyo. 1989).
21

See Crayton, 846 S.W.2d at 688-89 (noting there is a
"popular but erroneous belief that the Leon Court eviscerated the
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Against this substantial support, defendant has excerpted
pithy statements of fourteen jurisdictions which have refused to
adopt a good faith exception under their state exclusionary
rules, see Appellant's Br. at 30-39, without any analysis about
how the preferences of foreign jurisdictions bear on a Utah state
constitutional analysis. As such, it is deficient. See State v.
Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 645 (Utah App.)(merely relying upon "that
exclusionary rule;" determining the suppression of evidence has
no deterrent effect upon police misconduct and serves no public
policy when the police have acted in good faith and if deterrence
is the objective, "it is better served by application of a good
faith standard for the admission of the evidence seized pursuant
to a warrant than application of technical rules which encourage
disrespect for the criminal justice system and disregard of the
warrant requirement"); Brown, 708 S.W.2d at 145-47 (noting that
that the exclusionary rule was a judicial remedy not mandated in
Missouri; approving the Leon analysis that costs of exclusion of
inherently trustworthy evidence were not balanced by uncertain
deterrence of police misconduct; noting that statute still
requires that a warrant not issue except upon a verified
application or complaint; and finding it "injudicious" not to
admit evidence, based on the sheriff's conscientious efforts and
good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant); Saiz, 427
N.W.2d at 826 (rejecting the broader view of the exclusionary
rule whose purpose is to restrain government as a whole and which
sees each branch of government as a part of a single prosecution
network where no important distinction exists between the
procuring of evidence by law enforcement and its admission by the
courts, and adopting Leon as persuasive despite substantial
critique); Mers, 482 N.E.2d 783, 783 ns.7 and 10 (agreeing with
Leon that even if the exclusionary rule had an insubstantial
impact, the small percentage of lost prosecutions masked a large
number of felons who were released based on illegal searches or
seizures and that there existed no compelling reason for
rejecting the good faith exception at least until such time as
experience showed it to be unworkable or subject to abuse); Wood,
457 So. 2d at 210 (finding Leon "well grounded in law and
supported by empirical facts and strong policy considerations,
[and that it] advances the legitimate interests of the criminal
justice system without sacrificing the individual rights
guaranteed by the constitution").
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that in some cases, other states have interpreted their
constitutions to provide broader protections that the United
States Constitution" does not provide a sufficient reason for an
independent rule), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
In any case, eight of those cases are immediately
distinguishable for a variety of reasons, to wit: substantial
factual differences, unique statutory directives, unusual state
constitutional biases, or total lack of analysis.22

The

remaining six express the view that the purpose of the

22

Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 254-55 (Del. 1987)(finding Leon
inapplicable to warrantless
entry especially where entry could not be
justified by a subsequently issued search warrant which failed on its
face to meet statutory requirements to show both cause and
magistrate's finding for nighttime search); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d
426, 428-29 (Ga. 1992)(rejection of Leon based on statute
requiring
exclusion of evidence obtained without probable cause, with reference
to state constitutional requirement of probable cause mentioned only
in passing); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 897-903 (Haw. 1995)(search
conducted without a warrant,
judicial
authorization,
or valid consent;
the expectation of privacy declared under the state constitution in
the case relates to the defendant's residence, as opposed to an
automobile; the court misreads and broadens Leon to suggest that Leon
could be applied to a good faith reliance on an invalid consent to
search); Comm'w. v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 550-54, 554 n.5 (Mass.
1985)(concluding statute
rather than state constitution requires
suppression; unusual history of common law and statutory exclusion,
including evidence from (1) search incident to arrest and (2) failure
to knock and identify; concluding in one sentence footnote that good
faith cannot follow from the statutory violation); Stringer v. State,
491 So. 2d 837, (Miss. 1986)(lead opinion approved by only 3 justices
where five other justices expressly decline to address Leon); State v.
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1055-61 (N.M. 1993)(noting allegiance to
state constitutional probable cause standard which rejects Gates'
probable cause standard in case where no-knock warrant was issued and
executed without factual support or statutory authorization in state
where no-knock authority was clearly abused); People v. Biaelow, 488
N.E.2d 451, (N.Y. 1985)(rejecting Leon without any analysis); State v.
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 554, 561, 564 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting good faith
taking of a blood sample taken pursuant to "nontestimonial
identification order," not the equivalent of a warrant requiring
probable cause).
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exclusionary rule is broader than mere deterrence of police
misconduct, but rather protects the constitutional rights to
privacy and to a warrant based on probable cause, that the Leon
cost/benefit analysis is empirically unsupportable, and that the
good faith exception will lead to the erosion of judicial
integrity and appropriate police conduct.

While these claims

have some intrinsic merit, they are insufficient to justify a
departure from the federal constitution under the circumstances
of this case.
a - Breadth of Exclusionary Rule and Right of Privacy:

As a

predicate to rejecting Leon good faith, states have asserted that
their respective state constitutional exclusionary rules reach
more broadly than deterrence of police misconduct.23

However,

this Court has acknowledged the limited purpose of the federal
exclusionary rule, see Ziecrleman, 905 P.2d at 887, and with one
exception, only two justices of the supreme court have agreed
that the state exclusionary rule reaches any further than its
federal counterpart.24

Only in Thompson, did four justices agree

23

See State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting
that its exclusionary rule was limited to deterring police misconduct,
as expressed in Calandra); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1102-05
(N.H. 1995)(same); Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 844-49 (rejecting
Calandra's purpose of exclusionary rule as "constitutional amnesia");
Comm'w. v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897-98(Pa. 1991)(regarding
exclusionary rule as a "constitutional mandate," and a corollary of
the Fourth Amendment announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914)).
24

Indeed, in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 18(Howe, J.,
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.), the dissent asserted that the
prime, if not the sole, purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter
police misconduct, that the rule was "strong medicine which prevents
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that the right of privacy was more protected under state
exclusionary rule.

Id. 810 P.2d at 418. However, the privacy

concerns in this case are much narrower than in Thompson, where
under federal law a depositor had no expectation of privacy in
his bank records and had no standing to challenge their seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 417.

In this case, defendant

was stopped in a public place by officers checking for equipment,
licensing and registrations violations and "apparent" criminal
activity in "plain view" (SR. 10, 38).

She was immediately

found to be operating her car without a license or registration
and further detained because another passenger had an outstanding
warrant and no other passenger could legally drive the car (R.
109-10).

No decision of the supreme court suggests that a state

exclusionary rule would have been required to protect a
motoristfs privacy rights in such circumstances.25
b - Probable Cause:

Some states view Leon good faith as an

erosion of their constitutional probable cause standards, based
on their historical aversion to general warrants and writs of
assistance issued with no judicial review.26

Those concerns are

the enforcement of admittedly valid laws and should be taken no more
often than is necessary to ^combat the disease'")(citation omitted).
25

Cf. Poole 871 P.2d at 536 (Stewart, J., dissenting)(suggesting
that unnecessary independent state constitutional analysis resulting
in "dual" constitutional protections might have the unintended effect
of diminishing right of privacy).
26

State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 67 (Conn. 1990)(assuming that
exclusionary rule also intended to take seriously the probable cause
standard); Canelo, 842 A.2d at 1104-05 (tracing probable cause
standard from historical concerns about issuance of general warrants
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not present in this case, nor can they be under the state or
federal constitutions.

Further, the Leon reasonable reliance

test places limits on how far an officer's objective good faith
assessment of probable cause, or, in this case, compliance with
an administrative checkpoint plan, may stray before the
constitutionally determined limits come into play.

See Carter,

370 S.E.2d at 563 (Mitchell, J., dissenting)(evidence
intentionally seized by unlawful means is not rendered admissible
by the good faith exception).
c - Cost/Benefit Analysis:

States rejecting the good faith

exception have uniformly attacked Leon on its lack of empiricism
in its cost/benefit analysis generally and on its assessment of
costs through lost prosecutions particularly.27

However,

statistical studies suggesting that the cost of lost convictions
is minimal are not especially convincing.

Jurisdictions relied

on by defendant cite other findings from the same studies cited

and writs of assistance); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896-97 (same).
27

See Marsala, 579 A.2d at 64-66 (quoting T. Davies, "A Hard
Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the ^Costs' of
the exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of *Lost'
Arrests," 1983 Am. B. Found. Research J. 611, 622); Novembrino, 519
A.2d at 853(citing statistics that in a six-month period for 3
counties, coupled with a 12-month period for two other counties, only
one of 44 granted suppression motions involved a search warrant
defective for lack of probable cause); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 904 n.15
(citing statistics stating that motions to suppress were filed in
fewer than 5% of 7500 cases studied, motions to suppress were
successful only 0.7% of the time); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 123
(Vt. 1991)(citing same study, Nardulli, as Edmunds, and another study
reporting 1.5% of defendants going free as result of successful motion
to suppress physical evidence).
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by Leon, and the dissent in Novembrino, labels the results of the
independent study cited by the majority as "inconclusive."
Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 867 n.l (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, nonprosecution rates asserted as unsatisfactory to
support the Leon cost/benefit analysis, supra n.27, are of the
same order that the Supreme Court in Sitz found significant
enough to support the roadblock.

See, Sitz, 486 U.S. at 455

(public interest served by 1.6% DUI arrests, and opining that
much lower rates in the detection at checkpoint of illegal aliens
would also justify the enforcement measures).

See also Sims, 808

P.2d at 146 (reciting figures from Sitz, in distinguishing
unconstitutional roadblock).
Moreover, the costs of exclusion cannot be measured only in
numbers of lost prosecutions.

See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 907 n.l

(McDermott, J., dissenting)("One of [the social costs of freed
criminals] has been the breakdown of the deterrent effect of the
criminal law.")(citation omitted).

In this case, the minimal

intrusion on privacy rights occasioned by the checkpoint is more
than offset by the opportunity to remove from the road those
driving cars without licenses or registrations, as well as those
endangering others by drug and alcohol abuse while driving.
d - Judicial Integrity (magistrate shopping, judicial
dereliction of duty, and deterrence of official misconduct):
Courts rejecting Leon good faith assume that the exception
can only lead to a lessening of standards by both the courts and
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law enforcement.28

Cases relied on by defendant show uniformly

that the assumptions are entirely unsupported by data, in the
same way that Leon's detractors attack its cost/benefit analysis.
The majority in Oakes, asserts that the benefits of exclusion are
"non-events" which are "hard" to measure.
126.

Oakes, 598 A.2d at

However, if rejection of Leon good faith ameliorates

judicial and law enforcement's practice as alleged, then it would
seem possible, in non-adopting jurisdictions, to measure an
increase in police training programs or a percentage decrease in
overturned suppression motions based on lack of probable cause.
In fact, it is suggested, that "indiscriminate application of the
exclusionary rule may actually hinder the educative and deterrent
requirement of probable cause." Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 868
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting)(since the good faith exception
operates only when the officer acts reasonably, it provides in
those instances an incentive to police departments to formulate
for officers appropriate search and seizure rules).

3.

Justice O'Connor'a Dissent in Km 11 Fails to Provide
A Justification
for Departing from Federal Law.

Defendant cites Justice O'Connor's dissent in Krull, as a
secondary basis for rejecting the good faith exception under

28

Marsala, 579 A.2d at 67-68 (concluding that rejecting the good
faith exception will result in less judge shopping, more careful
judicial scrutiny of warrant applications, and encouragement to police
to work to establish probable cause); Oakes. 598 A.2d at 124-25
(same); Edmunds. 586 A.2d at 900-01 (exlusionary rule preserves
judicial integrity and the warrant issuing process).
48

article I, section 14. Appellant's Br. at 3 8-41.

The thrust of

this dissent is that unlike a defective warrant an
unconstitutional statute reaches more broadly, is the creation of
a legislature biased toward law enforcement, and provides a grace
period for unconstitutional conduct.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Krull. 480 U.S. at 361-69

Defendant, however, fails to show

why this Court should adopt a dissenting view, unsupported by any
other authority, as a basis for departing from now wellestablished federal law.

Indeed, in Chapman, the supreme court

applied Krull. finding that an officer acted in good faith in
relying on a county loitering ordinance, not then declared
unconstitutional.

Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451-52.

Thus, there is

no indication that Utah's appellate courts view the Krull
extension of Leon good faith as so confusing or inconsistent that
there should be a departure from federal law.29

Even a brief consideration of Justice O'Connor's dissenting
remarks show that they are not particularly relevant to this case.
First, the Krull good faith exception is secondary in this case
where law enforcement's good faith is premised primarily on its
conforming a plan to a statute followed by its reliance on the
circuit court's authorization of that plan, rather than law
enforcement's perception of the statute's constitutionality.
Second, Justice O'Connor's criticism, that the majority in Krull
created an unworkable rule because it could not specify how much
constitutional law an officer must know, see Krull. 480 U.S. at
366-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), is not persuasive in this
case. See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (recognizing a
standard in which a law officer must recognize a "*law so grossly
and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable
prudence would be bound to see its flaws,'" and implicitly
finding that officer made that determination)(quoting Michigan v.
DeFillippo. 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979)). Moreover, Deputy
Shiverdecker, and command level officers in the Utah County
Sheriff's Office particularly, would reasonably have known that
the checkpoint statute was enacted to fill an unconstitutional
49

There is no showing in this case that if the good faith
exception were jettisoned, there would be any better performances
by the judiciary or law enforcement, both of which, as argued
above, were reasonable.

In sum, under the facts of this case, to

wit: reliance on a plan approved by numerous circuit court
judges, this Court should find that there are no sufficient
policy reasons for departing from the federal good faith
exception under the state constitution.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed.
/?

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney
Attorney General
General
'KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

void in the area of roadblocks, and that by creating statutory
authorization for a checkpoint the legislature had overcome the
principal hurdle in establishing the checkpoint's
constitutionality. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 149. Third, the Utah
Supreme Court has implicitly rejected Justice O'Connor's concern
about the inappropriate creation of a legislative "grace period,"
for unconstitutional legislation when the good faith exception is
applied to a statute. Krull, 480 U.S. at 361, 366 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 451 n.9 (applying good
faith while expressly declining lead author's invitation to reach
the constitutionality of the ordinance). Lastly, Justice
O'Connor's claim, that good faith reliance on an unreasonable
statute is more socially costly than such reliance on a single
defective warrant, fails to recognize that the Leon exception, in
which she concurred, reaches a very great number of single
instances nationwide. In sum, none of these arguments
sufficiently support a departure from clearly stated federal law.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Randall K. Spencer, Utah County Public Defenders, attorneys for
defendant, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this
ry

day of November, 1997.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

Art. I, § 14

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or tiling
to be seized.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS
77.23-101.

Title of act.

Sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 may be cited as the "Administrative
Traffic Checkpoint Act."

77-23-102. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) *Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a roadblock procedure
where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor
vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those vehicles to
inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or the
production of documents.
(2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs, heads of law enforcement agencies, and all supervisory enforcement officers of sergeant rank
or higher.
(3) "Emergency circumstances" means circumstances where enforcement officers reasonably believe road conditions, weather conditions, or
persons present a significant hazard to persons or the property of other
persons.
(4) "Enforcement officer" includes:
(a) peace officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la;
(b) correctional officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la;
(c) special function officers as defined and under the restrictions of
Title 77, Chapter la; and
(d) federal peace officers as defined in Title 77, Chapter la.
(5) "Magistrate* includes all judicial officers enumerated in Subsection
77-1-3(4).
(6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles as defined in Title 41, Chapter
la.

77-23-103.

C i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t t i n g a n administrative
traffic c h e c k p o i n t .
A motor vehicle may be stopped and the occupants detained by an enforcement officer when the enforcement officer:
(1) is acting pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest
warrant;
(2) has probable cause to arrest or search;
(3) has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is
occurring;
(4) is acting under emergency circumstances; or

77-23-104. Magistrate authority required.
(1) An administrative traffic checkpoint may be established and operated
upon written authority of a magistrate.
(2) A magistrate may issue written authority to establish and operate an
administrative traffic checkpoint if:
(a) a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan
signed by the command level officer describing:
(i) the location of the checkpoint including geographical and topographical information;
(ii) the date, time, and duration of the checkpoint;
(iii) the sequence of traffic to be stopped;
(iv) the purpose of the checkpoint including the inspection or
inquiry to be conducted;
(v) the names of the personnel to be employed in operating the
checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in charge at the
scene;
(vi) the configuration and location of signs, barriers, and other
means of informing approaching motorists that they must stop and
directing them to the place to stop;
(vii) any advance notice to the public at large of the establishment
of the checkpoint; and
(viii) the instructions to be given to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and
(b) the magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that
the plan appropriately:
(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed;
(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry;
(iii) minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will experience;
(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the
individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the enforcement
officers.
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan meets the requirements of Subsection (2Kb), the magistrate shall sign the authorization and
issue it to the command level officer, retaining a copy for the court's file.
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to the
checkpoint command level officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of the checkpoint
shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined
in the plan.
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available to exhibit a copy
of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at
the checkpoint upon request of the motorist

77-23-105. Failure to stop — Criminal liability.

xneanor.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 961400364
DATE: July 5T1996

v.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, and having heard and considered the
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby denies the Defendant's Motion.
Factual Background
On September 16, 1995 the Defendant approached an administrative checkpoint near
the Tibbie Fork Junction in American Fork Canyon. The Utah Counly Sheriffs Office had
set up a roadblock which had been judicially approved. The Defendant was driving as she
and her passengers neared the roadblock. Upon reaching the roadblock the Defendant was
questioned by an officer who discovered that the Defendant was driving an unregistered
vehicle and that she did not have a valid driver's license.
Furthermore, it was discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for one of the
passengers who was placed under arrest. After speaking with the other passengers, and
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finding that there was no one who could legally drive the vehicle, the officers were forced to
impound the vehicle.
Deputy Shiverdecker asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle at which time he noticed
her agitated character. Realizing that she, with the other passengers, would be waiting at the
roadblock unattended until their ride came, Deputy Shiverdecker asked if the Defendant had
any weapons. The Defendant stated that she "did not have a knife.M The Deputy, suspicious
of her answer, attempted to neutralize the situation to assure the safety of those at the
roadblock by conducting a Terry search of the Defendant.
The Deputy conducted the Terryfriskby first patting down the Defendant's left pants
pocket which he felt contained change and other insignificant items. While patting down the
right pants pocket of the Defendant, Deputy Shiverdecker found it extremely full and bulging
such that he was unable to discern what the pocket contained. To facilitate the search the
Deputy asked the Defendant to empty her pocket which she did, however not completely.
The Deputy noted that there was still a bulge in her pocket and asked the Defendant what it
was. The Defendant then proceeded voluntarily to extract a small container which through its
transparent walls it appeared to contain methamphetamine.
Opinion of the Court
L

Fourth Amendment Principles
A. Regarding the Roadblock
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a roadblock.

Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). However, this MseizureM is

reasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment upon applying a balancing analysis. Sitz, 496
U.S. at 455. This balancing analysis includes 3 criterion; 1) the state's interest in preventing
accidents caused by drunk drivers, 2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving
that goal, and 3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints.
Id. at 449. When these criterion are met the roadblocks are allowed in order to check for
drunk drivers.
The applicable procedure for these "administrative traffic checkpoints" is set forth in
sections 77-23-101 through 77-23-105 of the Utah Code. The purpose of the roadblock, its
date, time and duration, the names of the personnel working the checkpoint, and the
instructions to be given to the officers at the checkpoint all need to be provided in the plan
I
which must be signed by a magistrate in order to effectuate the checkpoint. Utah Code § 7723-104 (1992). It is the responsibility of the Magistrate to ensure that the plan as proposed
and presented by the law enforcement officers does not violate any of the above 3 criterion in
Sitz and the limits set forth by the statute.
The officers who obtain the plan from the Magistrate invoke what the Supreme Court
termed a "good faith" rule which precludes the exclusion of evidence seized by an officer
when acting in good faith upon a warrant U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
B.

Regarding the Search of the Defendant's Person
Warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible only where probable cause and

exigent circumstances exist. State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). Such exigent
circumstances exist when a police officer feels that he or someone else may be in danger.
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This is measured by the "reasonably prudent man under the circumstances" standard. State v.
Ay da, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988), quoting State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah
1986).
DL
A.

Analysis
Regarding the Roadblock
Applying these Fourth Amendment principles to the present case, the Court finds that

with regards to the roadblock, the plan for the administrative checkpoint did not comply with
the terms of the statute because it was overly broad making it invalid and unconstitutional.
However, this situation is similar to that of obtaining a search warrant.

There is a

presumption, as stated above, that when an officer relies upon a warrant that has been
reviewed and issued by a neutral judge he is acting in good faith which precludes the
evidence from being excluded. Similarly, in the instant case, where the plan for the
roadblock was submitted to and approved by a magistrate the officers should be able to rely
upon such approval in good faith and therefore the evidence should not be suppressed because
of the good faith exception.
The statute describes various specifics with which the administrative checkpoint must
comply before it is to be approved by the judiciary. The time, date, duration, the names of
the personnel to be employed at the checkpoint, and the instructions and purpose of the
checkpoint must be included.
Although in the instant case the time, date and duration are included in the plan the
Court finds that an ongoing checkpoint which may be set up at any time over a period of a
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year is entirely too long and does not meet the intent of the statute.
Also, the names of the personnel are required to be on the plan, in this case merely the
office from which they were to come was placed on the plan. Thus, the specificity that the
statute requires was not included in the plan.
Lastly, the purpose as well as the instructions which the officers have at the roadblock
went beyond the scope of the statute. The roadblocks are ideally set up to check for drunk
drivers. By broadening the search the officers violate the third criterion of the Sitz test and
the search conducted at the roadblock becomes too intrusive upon an individual's rights.
B.

Regarding the Search of Defendant's Peison
Applying the above Fourth Amendment principles the Court finds that there were

sufficient exigent circumstances to authorize Deputy Shiverdecker's search of the Defendant's
person.
The Deputy was justified in performing the search of the Defendant because of the
circumstances that required the Deputy to leave the Defendant unattended at the checkpoint as
well as the agitated character of the Defendant, the suspicious answer regarding a "knife," and
the bulging pocket
The Deputy conducted the Terry search in an effort to reduce the possibility of harm
to himself or to his fellow officers. The following request to have the Defendant empty the
contents of her pocket was reasonable because the Deputy was unable to identify the objects
by merely feeling through the pockets. Furthermore, questioning her about what still
remained in her pocket was still within the bounds of the search and her voluntary production

of the item in no way provides reason which would allow the Court to suppress the evidence.
The search of Defendant's person was allowed because of the exigent circumstances
and the evidence will not be suppressed.
Order
Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an
order within IS days of this decision consistent with and in support of the terms of this
memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission
to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is
signed by the Court.
Dated thisJ^day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Mariane OTJryant, Esq.
Michael E. Jewell, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 961400364
DATE: September 11, 1996

v.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

LISA DEHERRERA,
Defendants.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda both in support of and
in opposition to the Motion, the Court delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
I
Opinion of the Court
The Court finds that the Defendant's arguments in support of her Motion to Reconsider
are fact sensitive issues that have been sufficiently addressed in the Court's prior ruling. In
addition, the Defendant argues that the Court should reconsider based on the State's failure to
proffer evidence in support of the Good Faith Exception. The Court finds that there is no
requirement for the State to prove good faith when the officers were acting pursuant to what
they believed was a valid warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.

154

Order
The Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration is denied.
Dated this 11th day of September, 1996.
BY THE COURT

ING, juneEy
cc:

Public Defender, Esq.
County Attorney, Esq.

15

ADDENDUM D

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:

:
:

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint No. 9

APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT

:
:

File No.

APPLICATION
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, the undersigned, a Command Level Officer of the Utah County Sheriffs Office, State
of Utah, hereby respectfully makes application for authorization to conduct an administrative
traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan:
1.

Location:

SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon.
I
Geographical and Topographical Information:
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade.
On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle.
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several
vehicles.

-.000

See attached Exhibit "A" for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "BH for
the ASGS Topographical Map.
Date:

15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992.

Time:

Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.

Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped:
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles.
Purpose:
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards;
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements;
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled
substances;
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required
exterior safety devices; and
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity.
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are
included in attached Exhibit WC."
Personnel:
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "EM attached shall
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also
listed on Exhibit "E" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical
information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D."
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6.

Signs, Barriers, etc.:
Exhibit MAH attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location,
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the
checkpoint.
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with signs in place.

7.

Advance Notice:
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days.
Notice will be run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint.

8.

Instructions to Personnel:
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached
as Exhibit MG.H Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command
level deputy in charge.
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature
of, and the effect of the deviation.
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed:
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan.
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
an offense is, or has been committed.
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can
be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the
checkpoint.
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4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area
when the inquiry is complete.
9.

Summary of this Plan Minimizes the Following:
a. Length of time the motorist is delayed, the maximum delay of five minutes,
or if all personnel are busy, then traffic is allowed to pass freely through
the checkpoint site.
b. Intrusion of the inspection or inquiry is minimized in that further intrusion
beyond that described in this plan must be based upon articulable
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
c. Fear and anxiety are minimized in that advanced publication of the
checkpoint appears in a local newspaper and advance signs are posted,
reading "Sheriffs Checkpoint Ahead" and "Have Driver's License Ready."
d. The degree of discretion is limited to adherence to the Sheriffs Department
Checkpoint Policy. See attached Exhibit MG," instructions to participating
deputies Exhibit HC,H and this cite plan.
e. Safety is maximized through the configuration and placement of warning
signs, barricades, flashing lights, traffic cones, auxiliary lighting, i.e.,
vehicle headlights, take down lights or spot lights. Safety of deputies is
maximized through the use of orange reflective vests and orange flashlight
cones.

DATED this

/ ^

day of

/b«^

, 1992.

6* - k* P~
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AUTHORIZATION
The undersigned has reviewed the foregoing plan and finds it to appropriately:
L Minimize:
a. The length of time motorists will be delayed;
b. The intrusion of the inspection or inquiry;
c. The fear and anxiety of the motorist; and
d. The discretion left to the enforcement officers operating the checkpoint.
2. Maximize the safety of motorists and enforcement officers.
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative
Traffic Checkpoint.
DATED this / *

day of

/U,<

, 1992.

/ClRCJ^f COURT JUDGE

-OCK
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Utah County Sheriff
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF

Lieutenant Craig W. Turner
Patrol Commander
Utah County Sherifffs Department
P.O. Box 330
P r o v o , Utah

84603

AFFIDAVIT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT AT SITE #9
8R 144 TIBBLE FORK AREA
Lieutenant Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff *s Department,
herein after referred to as Affiant, being first duly sworn deposes
and says that the following information with reference to the
request before the Court for Administrative Traffic Checkpoints at
Site #9, located on SR144 Tibbie Fork Area in American Fork Canyon
in Utah County is true and correct.
Affiant Craig W. Turner is the Patrol Commander with the Utah
County Sherifffs Department, having served in this capacity since
July 23, 1990. Affiant served as a Patrol Sergeant from February
25, 1985, to July 23, 1990. Affiant has been employed by Utah
County Sherifffs Department since July 1, 1981, and prior to this
date, was a full-time employee with Ogden City Police Department,
assigned to Patrol duties for 2 years and Detective duties for 5
years.
Affiant states that based on his experience and the experienced
opinions of the Utah County Sherifffs Patrol Division Staff, this
proposed checkpoint site is considered to be a problem area in Utah
County with regards to violations of the Utah Code Annotated.
Affiant has conducted traffic checkpoints in the past in American
Fork Canyon locations other than Tibbie Fork and has determined
that the Tibbie Fork area provides those features necessary in the
canyon with regards to the safety issue and the goals of the
checkpoint.
The natural curves on either end of the proposed
checkpoint area act as a speed inhibitor and make it difficult for
drivers to exceed the posted speed limit of 30 mph, further
enhancing the checkpoint supervisor's ability to control all
1
STREET ADDRESS: 51 So.

University Ave,, Suite 121 Provo, Utah 84601
Provo, Utah 84603

MAIUNGADDRESS: P.O. Box330,

*

PHONE: (801)370-8^00 r
FAX: (801)370-8832J \J

aspects of the checkpoint. T M S location also provides ample offroad parking, and escape lanes in the event a vehicle is unable to
stop or chooses to attempt to evade the checkpoint.
Affiant has approved and monitored df UdoL AU Administrative
Traffic Checkpoints sponsored by HIF Utah County Sheriff «•
Department at this site since 1984.
The majority of these
checkpoints have been conducted similarly to the proposed
Checkpoint Plan that is before the Court now. The warning signs and
the placement of these signs in prior checkpoints is very similar
to the current proposed plan.
Affiant has directed the operations of these checkpoints at this
site in daylight and dark, during hot and cold weather, under clear
conditions, during rainy conditions and snowing conditions while
utilizing similar checkpoint design and signing devices. Affiant
has never noticed or been made aware of any problems regarding
safety or visibility to participating law enforcement personnel or
the general public during any of the prior checkpoints at this
site. Affiant further states that no traffic accidents nor near
accidents have ever happened at this site during a checkpoint or
as a result of a checkpoint at this site.
Affiant has titter conducted a chcukjjuinL uL 11 s
during
conditions where ice or snow has accumulated on t hi
I iy nnr
does Affiant plan to conduct any checkpoints at this site when a
condition of this type would significantly reduce the ability of a
vehicle to come to a controlled stop.
Affiant further states that the checkpoint will Lc conducted 11
strict compliance with the current Checkpoint Policy c
County Sheriff's Department in every detail. A copy of 11 e cunenL
policy is included with the proposal before the Court, tompliance
with this policy includes, but is not limited to, the use of proper
lighting during the hours of dusk and dark. The minimum lighting
that will be used at this checkpoint site during the hours of
darkness will include, but not be limited to the following:
-Five flashing orange barricade lights.
-One flood light provided by a patrol vehicle overhead system.
-One set of flashing hazard lights mounted on a marked patrol
vehicle which will be visible to all traffic approaching the
site.
-Two handheld ^iumxnated orange flashlight va nds.
-Reflectorized orange vests worn by all participants.
-Reflectorization on all signs utilized as per the site plan.
-Ten reflectorized traffic cones.
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to create m lidn t
created a brief video tape of each checkpoint that is conducted at
this site. If the checkpoint is conducted during daylight hours
and extends into dark, the supervisor will create a brief video of
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the checkpoint during daylight and dark hours.
This video
documentation will be maintained on a permanent basis by the
Affiant.
Affiant will require the Checkpoint supervisor to furnish the
original written briefing plan and the debriefing plan to the
Affiant for inclusion in a permanent site record which will be
maintained by the Affiant.
Affiant further states that the checkpoint plan as submitted to the
Court has been examined in detail by the Utah County Sheriff1 s
Department Traffic Accident Specialist, who is certified as an
accident and traffic specialist by Northwestern University and is
currently recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by
various courts within Utah County. The specialist has informed me
that he has examined this site in regards to all road conditions
both natural and man made, speed limits, visibility, stopping
distances and all other factors which may have an effect on the
safety of this proposed plan. The specialist has informed me that
this plan as proposed is, in his opinion, safe. The specialist has
also assured Affiant that, in the proposed plan, he has factored in
an acceptable margin of error in the event of excessive speed of
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area.
WHEREFORE, Affiant swears and deposes that the information
contained herein is true and correct to the best of Affiant's
knowledge and belief.

/y^y Ins * M**t:>
/Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this AO^Say of

My commission Expires:
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UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF
CHECKPOINT BRIEFING INSTRUCTIONS
INCIDENT #
LOCATIONS

PLANNED SEQUENCE OF TRAFFIC TO BE CHECKED:
All traffic as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah
Code, traveling into the checkpoint area shall be stopped. ...
event that stopped traffic, waiting to be inspected, exceeds a five
minute wait, or the checkpoint supervisor determines that the
traffic backup is becoming a possible hazard , all traffic shall be
waived through the checkpoint until there are personnel available
to resume checking all vehicles.
ADDITIONAL SEQUENCE INSTRUCTIONSI

PURPOSE OF PHFPFPOTNTr
^

p e c t drivers i i c e n s e f i i c e n s e plates, uuluelu
registration and insurance.

InS

_

„iLh stal bull .Ian .
ghts and other exter i r HI v illicit* safety

3 and occupants for signs of intoxication
activity.
conduct exterior examination of vehicles by
to detect the odor of t inntrolled substanc
tine .

m and inquiry is e ;:i cpected to be less t
rat- \ >r
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PAGE 2 OF 2
INSTRUCTIONS TO PERSONNEL CONTINUED:
Note: Any significant deviation from the checkpoint plan
or policy, shall require specific permission from
the checkpoint supervisor.
The supervisor shall document the reasons for,
nature of and effect of the deviation.
2. Personnel actually conducting the inspections and
inquiries, shall be instructed as follows:
A. To be courteous during contact with drivers and direct
any inquiries regarding the checkpoint plan to the
supervisor.
B. To limit the inspection or inquiry to no more than one
minute unless, an articulable, reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, to believe an offense is being or has
been committed, exists, which would warrant further
inspection or inquiry and further delay of the
motorist.
C. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause warrants
continued inspection, investigation or arrest, the
subject vehicle will be moved to a location, out of
the traffic lanes to avoid a backup of traffic.
D. Upon completion of the inquiry, thank the motorist for
their cooperation and caution safety while exiting the
checkpoint site.
All of the above instructions on pages one and two have been
presented to all of the participating deputies at this checkpoint.
Date:

Time:

Supervisor Signature:
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CHECKPOINT EVALUATION REPORT
INCIDENT # _
DATE:

liT/IRT TTMI

, _ _ _ _

BND
HITM 1

LOCATION:
DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC CHECKED:_
APPLICANT:
AUTHORi:

N

MINI
CODRT:_

Mill' FTPVTI'I I III
Mil I II I III II

WEATHER 6 ROAD CONDITIONS:

t? TI r* r* n c n

PAGE

CHECKPOINT EVALUATION REPORT CONT.
PAGE 2 OF 2
DEPUTY

I NAME

| TOTALS

ALCO MISD FEL
ARR 1 ARR ARR

DUI
ARR

TRAF
ARR

WARR
ARR

VEH
IMP

CRS

TOTALS

REPORT

DEPUTY lrsOIVroUAI

CHECKPOINT INCIDENT*

DEPUTY:
DATE:

LOCATION:

ACTUAL TIME AT
DID
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ANY
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END:

START:

Oil

INHIIIMATTON?
O F CIIIMMINT
rnNl'TWNfi

POLICY?
YOU

NO

YES

IIAII

NO

YES
IN

IMIi'SAPPn
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Till!'!

INDIVIDUAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION
CAM,:
| CITE

#
#

ALCO
ARR

MISD
ARR

DUI
ARR

TRAF
ARR

WARR
ARR

VEH
IMP

CR'S

TOTALS

1

1 TOTALS

JI

NOTE: This report must be completed by each deputy participating
in the checkpoint, regardless of whether the deputy made any
arrests or citations.
This report must be turned in to the
checkpoint supervisor a t the end of the checkpoint*
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SWORN FULL-TIME PERSONNEL
(For Roadblock Purposes Only)
NAME

E ^ i

POSITION

Adams, Gary W.
Adamson, Shaun
Adcock, Art
Alexanderson, G w p
Bateman, David R.
Beals, Mark K.
Beederf Charlie
Bell, Peter
Bennett, Dave
Binks, Mark
Boone, Timothy D
Brunson, Dixie
Cannon, Spencer
Carlson, John
Carter, Scott
Castleberry, Neal
Casto, Dick
Christensen, lav
Clark, Kelly
Cloward. Glade
Colled]
Curtis

Deputy III\Patrol
Deputy IIAInv.
Deputy III\Patrol
Deputy IIAPatrol
Sheriff
Deputy IIAPatrol
Deputy IIAPatrol
Deputy II I\Patrol
SgtACSEPP Coord
Sgt.\Jail Opr.
Corr Specialist
SgtA Jail Opr
Corr. Specialist
LtACorrections
Sgt.Mnvestgations
Corr. Specialist
LtAEmg Svc
SecurityVLoss
Deputy III\Patrol
Deputy IIAJail
Lt. \ Jail Opr.
Deputy III\Patrol
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
Security\Loss
SgtAPatrol
Deputy IIAPatrol
Lt.Uud. Svcs.
Deputy IIAPatrol
Deputy IIAPatrol
SgtAlnv.
Deputy lAJud.Svc.
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
Deputy IIAInv.

(

3

I
I

tyne
Raymond

E

TV

I
F
T

1
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Hatfield, Debbie
Healey, Richard
Herkimer, Bonnie
Hill, Dave
Hodgson, Thomas R
Horn, Jens
Howard, Dennis
Hunt, Alex
Johnson, Marc
Jones, Gregory
Jones, Tracey
Kenkel, Chris
Lamph, David
Larsen, Camille
Martin, Charles
Mason, Leonard
McConnell, Mike
Monson, Jerry
Morgan, Michael
Morris, Lana
Murdock, Rex
Murphy, JoAnn
Orton, Pete
Orton, Todd
Packham, Kirby
Patterson, Larry
Pettro, Staci
Phillips, Kristy
Pickup, John
Pientka, Mike
Quarnberg, Owen
Rice, Yvette
Riding, Rob
Robinson, Jeff
Robinson, Rod
Roe, Patrick

POSITION
Corr. Specialist
Deputy IHAACO
Sgt.\Jail Opr.
Deputy JJIAPatrol
Deputy IIINPatrol
SgtAPatrol
Sgt.\Jail Opr.
SgtAPatrol
Sgt.Uudicial
SgtAPatrol
Deputy IUuv Ct.
Deputy JADist Ct.
Captain
Deputy I\Dist Ct.
Corr. Specialist
Deputy IUuv. Ct.
Deputy IIAPatrol
Deputy IIAPatrol
SgtADetox
SgtAAnimal Reg.
Deputy IIAJud. Svc
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
SgtAEmerg. Svcs.
Deputy I-Dist Ct
U w Clerk\Bailiff
Deputy IIAPatrol
Sgt.Uail Opr.
Captain
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
Deputy IIAInv.
Corr. Specialist
Corr. Specialist
Uw ClerkXBailiff

SWORN FULL-TIME PERSONNEL

U3-ZU-92

NAME

POSITION

Sam, Daniel S
Schuring, Lisa
Scott, Jerry
Shiverdecker,Owen
Shumway, Dan
Snyder, Dave
Swenson, Michael
Taylor, Dan
Taylor, Deke
Tracy, Jim
Turner, Craig
Waite, Alison
Wall, Frank
Witney, Carla

Law Clerk/Bailiff
Corr. Specialist
Captain
Corr. Specialist
Law Clerk\Bailiff
Deputy IIAACO
Corr. Specialist
Deputy III\Inv.
Deputy HlXPatrol
SgtATraining
LtAPatrol
Uw Clerk/Bailiff
LtAInvestigations
Deputy HlUud. Svc

PART-TIME EMPLOYEES
NAME

POSITION

Bersie, Michael
Brierly, Debbie
Case, Richard
Christian son, Richard
Frye, Kelly
Morgan, Perry
Pulham, Scott
Sorensen, Scott
Stilson, Chad
Thomas, Dan
Wright, Eric

Security/Loss
Deputy I\Dist. Ct.
SecurityNLoss
Security\Loss
Law Clerk/Bailiff
Security/Loss
Deputy I
Security\Loss
Deputy I
SecurityNLoss
SecurityNLoss
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51 So University Aue., Suite 12.1, Prouo. Utah 84601
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ROADBLOCKS/CHECKPOINTS

POLICY
724.10
The Sheriff's Department, in an effort to conserve its
resources and make the most economical use of its deputies
and equipment, will establish checkpoints at various locations
in Utah County- These checkpoints will be used, primarily, to
enforce Title 41 of the Utah State Code as an effective method
for protecting public safety and for creating a deterrent
effect through increased public perception of enforcement
activity.
Roadblocks for the apprehension of specific
criminal suspects will be consistent with provisions of the
10-200 procedure. (10-200 Utah County Roadwatch Program is
explained at the end of this section).
To insure the lawful completion of law enforcement actions,
while minimizing risk and inconvenience to the public, all
roadblocks and checkpoints will be conducted consistent with
the following procedures.
PROCEDURES
724.02
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES/EMERGENCY ROADBLOCKS
724.03
I. Such roadblocks are designed to limit or prevent vehicles
from entering unsafe or closed roads, as may be required by
extreme weather conditions, disasters, accidents, criminal
investigations, etc.
A. These roadblocks will be set up using available
equipment. As soon as possible, arrangements will be
made with highway maintenance departments, utility
companies, or other entities to supply flasher
barricades, flares signs, or other equipment and to
assume responsibility for staffing the roadblock.
ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKPOINTS
724.04
I. Checkpoints and their locations will only be established
and operated upon written authority of a magistrate. The
magistrate may issue written authority to establish and
operate an administrative traffic checkpoint if:
A. The Operation's Bureau Captain, Patrol lieutenant, or

•00r

014

Con't. 724.04
their command level (rank of sgt. of above) designee
submits to a magistrate a written plan signed by the
command level supervisor.
1. The plan shall include the specific location of
the
checkpoint
including;
geographical
and
topographical information.
2. The configuration and location of signs,
barriers and other means of informing approaching
motorists that they must stop and directing them
where to stop.
a. Diagrams and photographs of the site
showing road character,
i.e. grades, curves, shoulder width and
photographs included.
3. Date, time and duration of the checkpoint.
4. Sequence of traffic to be stopped.
5. Purpose of the checkpoint including the
inspection or inquiry to be conducted.
6: Names of personnel to be employed operating the
checkpoint including the name of the command level
deputy in charge of the checkpoint
7. The advanced notice to the public at large of
the establishment of the checkpoint.
a. Including the certification of publication
in
a
local
newspaper
having
general
circulation.
b. The advanced public notice shall be made in
the following manner.
1) Each month a command level deputy or
his designee shall place one notice for
three (3) days in a newspaper having
general
circulation
stating:
"DURING THE MONTH OF
THE UTAH
COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT WILL BE
ESTABLISHING ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKPOINTS
UNDER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT UTAH
COUNTY IN AUTHORIZED AREAS WITH REGARD TO
ENFORCING TITLE 41 OF THE UTAH STATE
CODE. A LIST OF AUTHORIZED AREAS IS
POSTED AT THE COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE
BUILDING.
8. Briefing instructions shall be given to
participating deputies prior to the establishment
of the checkpoint. Briefing instructions shall
be included in the checkpoint plan.
II. A magistrate shall make an independent judicial
determination that the plan includes the following:
A. minimizes the length of time the motorist will be
delayed.

-000
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Con f t. 724.04
B. Minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inquiry•
C. Minimizes the fear and anxiety the motorist will
experience.
D. minimizes the discretion to be exercised by the
individual enforcement deputies operation the checkpoint.
F. Maximizes the safety of the enforcement deputies and
the motorist.
G. Which vehicles shall be stopped and a plan to keep
traffic moving with minimal delay, i.e. every vehicle
or every third vehicle.
CHECKPOINT IMPLEMENTATION
724.05
I. Checkpoints and their locations shall be established after
magistrate approval and in compliance with the approved plan.
A. Administrative checkpoints shall be staffed with a
minimum of three (3) deputies. One of the three must be
a command level deputy with the rank of sergeant or above
shall be in charge of the operation of the checkpoint.
The deputy in charge will:
1. Have authority to make all on scene decisions
concerning the operation of the checkpoint in the
field, consistent with state law and Utah County
policy and procedure.
2. Conduct a briefing for all participating
deputies prior to establishing of the checkpoint.
a. Deputies shall be instructed as to the
procedure to be followed in the approaching
vehicles, initial contact with drivers.
3. Debriefing shall be conducted by the checkpoint
commander, immediately following the conclusion of
the checkpoint.
The debriefing is to provide an
immediate critique of the operation and to receive
constructive comment from those involved. At this
time a summary of enforcement action taken at the
checkpoint will be accumulated. The checkpoint
commander shall or shall cause to be done the
following: A summary shall include number and type
of arrests or citations, approximate number of cars
passing through the checkpoint.
4. Initiate an incident report.
5. Fill out checkpoint evaluation form UCSD OP FORM
16 (see example)•
6. A copy of the plan and signed authorization
shall be issued to the checkpoint command deputy.
7. The checkpoint command deputy shall be available
to exhibit a copy of the plan and
signed
authorization to any motorist who has been stopped
upon the request of the motorist.
8. Upon the completion of the checkpoint the
immediate area shall be policed and any debris or
refuse generated as a result of the checkpoint

~3~
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Con,t.724.05
shall be cleaned up.
B. Although the exact time and location of the checkpoint
shall not be made public in advance, their use will be
widely publicized to enhance the desired deterrent effect
among potential violators.
C The checkpoint shall be maintained at the approved
location for a time period consistent with the activity
experienced, but not to exceed the duration set forth in
the checkpoint plan.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
724.06
I. Each checkpoint site shall be staffed with a sufficient
number of uniformed deputies to maintain safe and efficient
operation.
II. Appropriate reflectorized safety equipment shall be
provided and utilized by all personnel. These may include
flares (fuses) and or reflectors to illuminate the site and
aid in traffic direction. Warning signs, flares, cones and or
other emergency lighting equipment shall be utilized and
displayed in compliance with the site plan.
III. Deputies on the checkpoint line shall use a flashlight
with a orange traffic direction cone attached, to assist in
the direction of traffic and aid in visibility during hours of
darkness.
IV. Orange reflective safety vests shall be worn by on line
deputies during hours of darkness.
V. Signs shall be placed at the checkpoint site prior
establishing the checkpoint. Sign placement shall be exactly
as diagrammed and approved in the authorized checkpoint plan.
A. The signs shall be placed to insure that the public
has adequate advanced warning of the checkpoint.
1. The signs shall be illuminated by a light source
during hours of darkness.
a. For example the sign may state:
"CAUTION-SHERIFFS CHECKPOINT AHEAD"
"CAUTION-SHERIFFS ROADBLOCK AHEAD"
2. If "NO U TURN" sign(s) is used, chase patrol
vehicle shall be positioned near the sign.
a. Vehicles approaching the checkpoint and
making a prohibited WUM turn shall be pursued
and stopped.
b. Patrol vehicles shall be strategically
positioned to assure safety as well as
efficiency in pursuing non-compliant vehicles
c. The stop on the non-compliant vehicle shall
be handled as a traffic violator stop.
d. The "NO U TURN" signs shall be positioned
so as to create a safer checkpoint. This
enables traffic to be closely controlled and
prohibits approaching vehicles from turning
into oncoming traffic near the checkpoint.

-4-
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Con't. 724.06
e. A vehicle making a "UM turn to avoid the
is not by itself, justification for searching
the vehicle. It may be considered as a factor
in establishing probable cause.
1) All searches of such vehicles shall be
consistent with Section 4, subsection B
of this policy.
2) All impounds shall be made consistent
with provisions of the Utah County
Sheriff1s policy and procedure manual
section 730.
f. Sufficient room shall be maintained at all
times to allow a fleeing vehicle to safely
pass through the checkpoint area.
1) Such violations shall be pursued in
compliance
with
the
pursuit
policy
contained herein.
2) persons
failing to stop at an
administrative
checkpoint
shall
be
arrested pursuant to state law.
MOTORIST CONTACT
724.07
I. Contact between deputies and motorists shall be done in a
professional manner.
A. The driver of each vehicle contacted at the checkpoint
shall be advised by the contacting deputy the purpose of
the checkpoint and request the drivers license and
registration.
1. Deputies shall observe the occupants for signs
of intoxication or other criminal activity.
a. Deputies shall observe the stopped vehicle
interiors for evidence of criminal activity in
plain view.
1) Deputies may search the vehicle only
as authorized by law. Consent searches
must be based on probable cause and with
permission of the owner ( or the driver if
the owner is not present).
2. If all documents appear to be in order and no
other violations of the law are suspected the
vehicle shall be directed to proceed with caution
through the checkpoint.
3. Should a search, arrest or citation be necessary
the driver shall be directed to move to an out-of
-traffic location designated for that purpose. There
the matter can be more fully investigated.
a. The deputy developing the probable cause
shall direct the remaining
investigation
process.
1) All reports, citations and other

O00

C o ^ t . 724.07
documents are the responsibility of this
deputy.
2) A sperate incident report shall be
created for the specific incident. All
documents generated will be referenced to
this incident number.
3) Any incident numbers generated as a
result of the checkpoint
shall be
referenced
to
the
incident
number
assigned to the command level deputy for
the checkpoint.
B. The sequence of traffic to be stopped( i.e. either all
vehicles or every third vehicle) as authorized by the
magistrate shall be followed.
1. If the number of vehicles begin to back up to
where the delay would be greater than five (5)
minutes, or the backing traffic creates a safety
hazard, the traffic shall be directed to pass
through the checkpoint, with only obvious violators
being detained. This will continue until the delay
has been minimized, or the safety hazard has
dissipated.
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PROOF OF PUBLICATION
from

STATE OF UTAH
Utah County

{I

Janette Holland

depose and say that I am the

^^

flrst d u j y s w o r n

Legd-1- C l e r k . . . of The Daily Herald

a newspaper of general circulation, published W times each week at Provo,
Utah, County of Utah; that the notice attached hereto, and which is a copy

NOTICE
During the month of May,
the Utah County Sheriffs
Department will be establishing
checkpoints
throughout Utah County in
problem areas with regard
to enforcing Title 41 of the
Utah State Code. •
DAVID R. BATEMAN
T,-SHERIFF
No. 5187 Published In The
Daily Herald April 13,»14,
15. 1992.

Thrse
was published in said newspaper for

Consecutive

issues, the first publication having been made on the

. . . . . . . day

19.92. . ., and the last on the
. 1 ?th
day
19.92. m . - that said notice was published in the regular

of . Apfi 1
of . /^PrI \

and entire issue of every number of the paper during the period and times
of publication, and the same was published in the newspaper proper and not
in the supplement.

Q^&,,
Subscribed and sworn to before me thu

.ARri.l

'.5th

A.D.,19

day of

92.
Notary Public

Residence... . 0 r e m . ' . U t a h

iZ^Z"

My Commission expires . .June . 2 6 , . .1994!

ROBERT F. JOHAKSON
etoOWLYhERAlD
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Utah County Sheriff
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF

PUBLIC NOTICE

The following locations have been selected and approved by
Sheriff David R. Bateman for checkpoints.
Checkpoints will be
conducted at the below locations effective May 1, 1992 and
throughout the remainder of the year.

Site
Site
Site
Site
Site
Site
Site
Site
Site
This

#1 SR 92 & Timpcave
#2 SR 68 & Jet SR 73
#3 SR 68 & Tickville Wash
#4 SR 114 Geneva Road
#5 Hobble Creek Canyon Road
#6 Diamond Fork Canyon Road
#7 SR 89 & Thistle
#8 Payson Canyon Road
#9 SR 144 - Tibbie Fork
list is subject to change with out notice

51 So. University Ave., Suite 121, Provo, Utah 84601
MAILING ADDRESS PO. Box 330, Provo, Utah 84603

STREET ADDRESS

m IONE (801) 370-880O\ ( V
FAX (801)370-8832
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LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL

2

&&&

3

Approved for Filing

4

Date

5

01-29-92

*&&
LJW
1:47 PH

(ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINT ACT)

6

1992

7

GENERAL SESSION

8

H. 8. No. 259

H. B. No. 259

By

Ray Short

9
10
11

AN ACT

RELATINC TO

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE; PROVIDING

AUTHORIZATION

FOR

12

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC CHECKPOINTS AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

13

AND OPERATION.

14

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

15

ENACTS:

16

77-23-101, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

17

77-23-102, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

18

77-23-103, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

19

77-23-104, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

20

77-23-105, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953

21
22
23

Be it enacted bv the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1.

Section

77-23-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted

to read:

24

77-23-101. Title of part.

25

Sections

26
27
28
29

77-23-101

through

77-23-105

mav

be

cited

as

the

"Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act".
Section 2.

Section

77-23-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted

to read:
77-23-102. Definitions

*&£» H. B. Ko. 259

01-29-92 1:47. PM &&&

1

As used in this part:

2

(1)

"Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a roadblock

3

where

enforcement

4

vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject

5

inspection

6

production of documents*

officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor

(2)

8

enforcement

9

sergeant rank or higher*
(3)

those

vehicles

"Command level officer" includes
agencies,

and

all

all

sheriffs,

supervisory

heads

enforcement

officers

"Emergency circumstances" means circumstances where
reasonably

believe

road

conditions,

weather

of

officers

12

persons present a significant hazard to persons or the property of

13

persons,
(4)

"Enforcement officer" includes:

15

(a)

peace officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77;

16

(b)

correctional officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77;

17

(c)

special

of Chapter la. Title 77; and
(d)

federal peace officers as defined in Chapter la. Title 77;

20

(5)

"Magistrate"

23
24
25

other

function officers as defined and under the restrictions

19

22

of

conditions, or

14

21

law

enforcement

11

18

co

or testing and the drivers or occupants to Questioning or the

7

10

procedure

includes

all

judicial

officers

enumerated

in

Subsection 77-1-3(4).
(6)

"Motor

vehicle"

includes all vehicles &$ defined in Chapter 1«

Title 41,
Section 3.
to read:

Section 77-23-103. Utah Code Annotated 1953.

is

enacted

&&& H. B. No. 259

*
2
3
4
5
6

77-23-103*

01-29-92 1:47 PM &&&

Circumstances

permitting

an

A motor vehicle may be stopped

and

the

occupants

(1)

(3)

has

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or

is occurring;

10

(4)

is acting under emergency circumstances; or

11

(5)

is acting pursuant to a duly authorized

12

checkpoint

13

77-23-104.

authority

Section 4.

77-23-104,

17

(1)

20
21
22
23
24
25

administrative

traffic

granted by a magistrate in accordance with Section

Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

is

enacted

to read:

16

19

an

warrant;

8

18

bv

is acting pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest

has probable cause to arrest or search;

15

detained

enforcement officer when the enforcement officer!

(2)

14

traffic

checkpoint.

7

9

administrative

An

Magistrate authority required.

administrative

traffic

checkpoint

may

be established and

operated upon written authority of a magistrate.
(2)

A magistrate

may

issue

written

authority

to

establish

and

operate an administrative traffic checkpoint if:
(a)

a command level officer submits to the magistrate a written plan

signed bv the command level officer describing:
Ci)

the

location

of

the

checkpoint

including

geographical

and

topographical information;
(ii)

the date, time, and duration cf the checkpoint;
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(iii)

2

(iv)

3
*
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the secuer.ee of traffic to be stopped;
the

purpose

of

the

checkpoint

including

the inspection or

inquiry to be conducted;
(v)

the names of the personnel

to

be

employed

in

operating

the

5

checkpoint including the name of the officer or officers in charge at the

6

scene;

7

(vi)

the

location of signs, barriers, and other

means

9

directing them to the place to stop;

H
12
13
14
15

(vii)

informing

and

8

10

of

configuration

approaching

motorists

that

thev

must

stop

and

er»v advance notice to the public at large of the establishment

of the checkpoint; and
(viii)

the instructions to be

given

to

the

enforcement

officers

operating the checkpoint; and
(b)

the

magistrate makes an independent judicial determination that

the plan appropriately;

16

(i) minimizes the length of time the motorist will be delayed;

17

(ii) minimizes the intrusion of the inspection or inouirv;

18

(iii) minimizes the fear and ar.xietv the motorist will experience;

19

(iv) minimizes the deeree of

20
21
22

discretion

to

be

exercised

bv

the

individual enforcement officers operating the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes

the

safety

of

the

motorist

and

the

enforcement

officers.

23

(3)

Upon

24

reouirements

determination
of

Subsection

bv

the

(2Mb),

magistrate that the plan meets the
the

magistrate

shall

sign

the
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1

authorization and issue it to the command level officer, retaining a copy

2

for the court's file.

3

(4)

A

copy

of the plan and signed authorization shall be issued to

*

the checkpoint command level officer participating in

5

the checkpoint.

6

(5)

Any

enforcement

officer

the

operation

participating in the operation of the

7

checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable

8

procedures outlined in the plan.

9

(6)

The

checkpoint

command

level

officer

shall

exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any

11

has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist.

13

Section 5.

Section

to

the

be available to

*0

12

of

motorist

who

77-23-105, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted

to read:

14

77-23-105.

15

Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes,
required,

Failure to stop —

anv

administrative

Criminal liability.
without

stopping

16

as

17

authority of a magistrate as provided in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a

18

class B misdemeanor.
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MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL ANALYSIS
H. B. 259
The additional workload to the courts for magistrates review,
issuance of warrants and appeals is estimated to be approximately
$18,800 in General Funds per year, starting in FY 1993. Increases
in civil and criminal action revenue, resulting from administrative
traffic check points, cannot be estimated at this time.

OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST

ADDENDUM E

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*************************

IN THE MATTER OF:

FINDINGS

ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT NO. 9
(SR 144 Tibbie Fork Canyon)

CASE NO.

**************************

On June 15# 1992, the Utah County Attorney's office, together
with Lt. Craig W. Turner of the Utah County Sheriff's office,
submitted

a

written

application

and

authorization

for

an

administrative traffic checkpoint. The only issue before the court
is whether the authorization which is sought is allowed by virtue
of compliance with House Bill 259.

The constitutionality of

administrative checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of Utah's Constitution
is not at issue.

The application is supported with over 20 pages

of exhibits, 8 relevant photographs, and a copy of House Bill No.
259, the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act.
information

regarding

the

safety

of

the

Supplemental

motorists

and

the

enforcement officers was required by Judge Lynn W. Davis.

Lt.

Craig W. Turner, Patrol Commander of the Utah County Sheriff's
submitted a supporting affidavit dated June 12, 1992. This court
has

carefully

reviewed

the application

and

the

exhibits to

determine compliance with the Act. Of major concern of this court,

•000

is the protection of citizenry; the health, safety and welfare of
the travelling and pedestrian and law enforcement public are vital.
This court makes the following:
FINDINGS
1. House Bill 259 (Administrative traffic Checkpoint Act) was
passed in the 1992 session of the Utah State Legislature.
2. House Bill 259 went into effect on Monday, April 27, 1992.
3. The application seeks authority to stop vehicles under 7723-103(5) which purports to allow vehicle stops and occupant
detention when the enforcement officer Mis acting pursuant to a
duly authorized administrative traffic checkpoint authority granted
by a magistrate in accordance with § 77-23-104."
4.

For the purposes herein, Judge Lynn W. Davis, a Fourth

Circuit Court Judge, is acting as a magistrate.
5.
command

Officer Craig Turner, Deputy Utah County Sheriff, is a
level

officer

and has

submitted

a written

plan in

conformity with 77-23-104(2)(a)(i).
6.

The location of the checkpoint, geographically and

topographically, is adequately described in paragraph 1 of the
application.

An ASGS topographical map is attached to the

application as Exhibit "B" and the photographs in Exhibit "F"
further visually describe the area. The application fully complies
with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(i).
7.

The date, time and duration of the checkpoints are

adequately described in paragraph No. 2 of the application and the
applicant has complied fully with the requirements of 77-232
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104(2)(a)(ii).

There is nothing in the Act which would appear to

preclude the seeking of a multiple-day authority as requested by
the applicant herein. Faithful compliance with the plan would, of
course, be necessary on all authorized days.
8.

The sequence of the traffic to be stopped is adequately

and reasonably identified in paragraph No. 3 in the application and
the applicant has fully complied with the requirements of 77-23104(2)(a)(iii).
9.

The purpose of the checkpoint and the inspection or

inquiry to be conducted are adequately and reasonably identified in
paragraph

No.

4,

a,

b,

c,

d,

and

e

Furthermore, the court finds that Exhibit

of
,f ff

C

the

application.

attached to the

application supplements the purposes and the inquiry set forth in
the application.

The court specifically finds that the applicant

has complied with the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(iv).
10.

The request of the applicant is for a continuing, large

scale checkpoint for 75 days.

By virtue of that uniqueness, the

applicant has provided a pool of names of officers who will
participate in the checkpoints. The pool is comprised of the names
of officers who actually will participate, but the exact assignment
has not yet been determined.

Paragraph No. 5 of the application

provides that a minimum of three uniformed deputies will be present
at each checkpoint, with one being a uniformed patrol sergeant.
The patrol sergeant shall be the command level deputy in charge of
the checkpoint.

The court further finds that the patrol sergeant

shall maintain a roster of participating deputies.
3
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While 77-23-104(2)(a)(v) appears to require exactitude in the
naming of personnel, it certainly does not appear that a pool of
names as provided herein would be necessarily precluded.
This court

finds that the

information

contained

within

paragraph No. 5 of the application, together with the information
contained

in

Exhibit

"E"

sufficiently

complies

with

the

requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(v). (This court, as an aside, has
also made this finding of compliance based upon the best interests
of justice, judicial economy, 1 court case as opposed to 75 cases
opened reducing clerk staff time etc., and based upon the realities
of law enforcement and daily life; law enforcement officers may be
called

at any time, even while conducting

a checkpoint, to

emergencies and/or a specifically identified officer may become
sick, etc. Would a substitution of an equally trained, qualified
and competent officer defeat the checkpoint, absent magisterial
sanction for the substitution?
is that

trained,

uniformed

The critical concern of this court
officers, conduct

the

checkpoint

according to the magisterial authorized plan and that a patrol
sergeant be present who is in charge.

The pooled concept appears

both to meet the intent of the law and the health, safety and
welfare concerns of this court in protecting the travelling and
pedestrian and law enforcement citizenry of this community.)
11.

Exhibit

"A"

attached

to

the

application

and

the

photographs in Exhibit M F M depict the types and location/site, and
spacing of signage which will be used.

The application satisfies

the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vi).
4
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12.

A reference is made to advance notice in paragraph 7 of

the application.

Legal notice, though very generic, has been or

will be published in the Legal Notice section of the Provo Daily
Heraldr running for three consecutive days. Notice is or has been
run within 30 days prior to the establishment of the requested
checkpoint.

The application is supported by Exhibit M G M f which

contains a copy of the Legal Notice published on Wednesday, April
15, 1992 in Section D page 3 of the Provo Daily Herald.
publication has also been presented.

Proof of

The court takes judicial

notice that the Provo Daily Herald is a newspaper of wide and
general circulation in Utah County. Accordingly, this court finds
the application meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(a)(vii).
13. Exhibit "C" attached to the application details the
instructions that will be read by each Officer involved in the
operation of the checkpoint and satisfies the requirement of 77-23104(2)(a)(viii).
14.

The court finds that the plan minimizes the length of

time the motorist will be delayed (77-23-104(2)(b)(i)) because of
the following:
a)

Routine inspection and inquiry is expected to be
less than one minute in duration;

(see Utah

County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing Instruction,
paragraph 6, attached as Exhibit
b)

,f M

C ).

In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a 5 minute wait, all traffic
shall be waived through checkpoint until there
5

oor

are

available

vehicles.
c)

Safety

personnel

to

check

arriving

(Application, paragraph 3).

precautions

have

been

faithfully

addressed.
15.

The Court further finds that the intrusion upon the

travelling public is minimal and that the plan anticipates that
routine inspection and inquiry is expected to take less than one
minute in duration.
Instructions).

(Utah County Sheriff Checkpoint Briefing

77-23-104(2)(b)(ii).

Deviation from the plan is

not permitted except as authorized under specific circumstances.
16. The court finds under 77-23-104(2)(b)(iii), that the plan
takes measures to attempt to minimize the fear and anxiety the
motorist will experience by virtue of:
a)

signage;

b)

notice;

c)

the location of the checkpoint is a straight-of-way;

d)

safety issues have been faithfully addressed;

e)

pull off areas for the travelling public are provided;

17. The court further finds that the degree of discretion to
be exercised by individual enforcement officers operating the
checkpoint is minimized (77-23-104(2)(b)(iv)) by virtue of the
following:
a)

the exact location is established;

b)

the signage is established by the plan;

c)

the length of time the motorist will be delayed is
established by the plan;
6
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d)

sequence of traffic issues are addressed by the plan;

e)

inquiry is limited under the plan;

f)

any necessary further inspections will be conducted out of
traffic lanes;

g)

most importantly, any deviation from the checkpoint plan
or policy

shall require specific permission

from the

checkpoint supervisor who shall document the reasons for,
nature of and effect of any deviation (Utah County Sheriff
Checkpoint Briefing Instructions, page 2, 2(d)).
18.

The application satisfies the requirements of 77-23-

104(2)(a)(v).

The utilization of signage, notice, flashing lights

take into account safety measures to protect the travelling and
pedestrian traffic.

The location chosen has pull off areas and is

a straight-of-way.

This finding is based upon the plan of the

exhibits submitted

and the affidavit of Officer Craig Turner.

Specifically, the court relies upon the affidavit which supports
the facts that the court finds that:
a)

the

choice

of

location

is

based

upon

safety

considerations;
b)

SR 144, approx 1 mi. from the junction with SR92 in
American

Fork

Canyon

provides

the

best

conditions

available with regards to safety issues and the goals and
purposes of the checkpoint;
c)

Lt. Turner has participated in or supervised at least 20
checkpoints at this location since 1984;

d)

it is a location where the patrol sergeant (supervisor)

7

can control all aspects of the checkpoint;
e)

the location provides escape lanes in the event a vehicle
is unable to stop or chooses to attempt to evade the
checkpoint;

f)

the warning signage and placement is similar to that
utilized in the past and safety problems to the travelling
public and the participating

officers have not been

problematical;
g)

no traffic accidents nor near accidents have ever happened
at this site during a checkpoint or as a result of a
checkpoint at this site;

h)

adequate lighting will be utilized to alert the travelling
public when conducted at night;

i)

the plan has been submitted to, and examined in detail by#
the Utah County Sheriff's Department Traffic Accident
Specialist, who is certified as an accident and traffic
specialist by Northwestern University and who is currently
recognized as a traffic accident reconstruction expert by
courts in Utah County;

j)

said specialist has examined the plan with respect to all
road conditions, both natural and man made, speed limits,
visibility, stopping distances and all other factors which
may have an effect on the safety of the proposed plan;

k)

in addition, the specialist has factored in an acceptable
margin of error in the event of excessive speed of
vehicles entering the checkpoint warning area;

8

k)

after thorough examination and review, the Department's
Traffic Accident Specialist has opined that the plan# as
submitted, is safe.

18. By virtue of the above findings, this court specifically
finds that the plan meets the requirements of 77-23-104(2)(b) as
required by 77-23-104(3) and the balance of the requirements of the
Act and that authorization to conduct the checkpoint in accordance
with the plan may issue.
DATED this /jT day of June, 1992.

LYNN W. DAVIS
Fourth Circuit Court Judge
Acting as Magistrate
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ADDENDUM F

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CRAIG R. MADSEN #2045
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT

IN THE MATTER OF:

:
:

Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint No. 9

ORDER AUTHORIZING
ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC
CHECKPOINT

:

File No.

£ £ £ / - //73

A1S

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn Davis presiding, on the State's
Application for Administrative Checkpoint filed on or about June 15, 1992. The Court, having
considered the application and made and entered itsfindingsof fact and being fully advised in
the premises, does hereby issue the following authorization to Craig Turner, a command level
officer in the Utah County Sheriffs Office, to operate an administrative traffic checkpoint to be
supervised by any of the following command level sergeants of the Utah County Sheriffs Office:
Kerry Evans, Jens Horn, Alex Hunt, Mike McConnell or Jim Tracy.
1. Location: SR 144 in Tibbie Fork Canyon approximately one (1) mile from the
junction with SR 92 in American Fork Canyon.
Geographical and Topographical Information:
SR 144 is a paved two-lane road. The character of the road has a slight grade.
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On the east side of the road is a narrow shoulder wide enough for one vehicle.
On the west side of the road is a large gravel shoulder available for several
vehicles.
See attached Exhibit HAM for a site diagram and see attached Exhibit "BM for the
ASGS Topographical Map. (All Exhibits in this order refer to exhibits attached
to the application and are hereby incorporated by reference and shall also be
attached to this order.)
2. Date: 15 June 1992 through 30 September 1992.
Time: Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.
3. Sequence of Traffic to be Stopped:
All traffic, as defined in Title 41-1-1(42) of the Utah Traffic Code, traveling
east and west shall be stopped. In the event stopped traffic waiting to be
inspected exceeds a five minute wait, all traffic shall be waived through the
checkpoint until there are available personnel to check arriving vehicles.
4. Purpose:
a. To inspect license plates, registration certificates and insurance cards;
b. To inspect compliance with seatbelt and child restraint requirements;
c. To inquire if drivers have been drinking or are impaired by controlled
substances;
d. To visibly inspect the operation of required lights and other required
exterior safety devices; and
e. To inspect for other apparent criminal activity.
Instructions given to participating deputies regarding operation and purpose are
included in attached Exhibit "C."
5. Personnel:
A minimum of three uniformed deputies listed on Exhibit "E" attached shall
be present at all times, one of which shall be a uniformed Patrol Sergeant, also
listed on Exhibit ME" attached. The uniformed Patrol Sergeant is the command
level deputy in charge of the checkpoint. The deputy in charge shall be
responsible to maintain the roster of the deputies participating and statistical
2
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information concerning the checkpoint, as provided in attached Exhibit "D."
Participating deputies may be any of the Sheriffs officers identified in Exhibit
"EM provided that any officer participating is fully briefed and operates in
accordance with this order.
6.

Signs, Barriers, etc.:
Exhibit HAM attached includes a sight diagram which depicts the location,
spacing, and the type of signs used to warn approaching vehicles of the
checkpoint.
Photographs in Exhibit "F" attached, depict the site with signs in place.

7.

Advance Notice:
The notice attached as Exhibit "G" will be, or has been, published in the Legal
Notice section of the Provo Daily Herald, running for three consecutive days.
Notice will run within 30 days prior to the establishment of any checkpoint.

8.

Instructions to Personnel:
a. All participating deputies/officers shall be briefed on the content of this
plan and be given a copy of the Utah County Sheriff Department Policies
and Procedures of Checkpoints/Roadblocks. A copy of which is attached
as Exhibit HG." Each deputy shall be instructed to become familiar and
comply with this plan and the department policies. Significant deviation
from the plan or policy shall require specific permission from the command
level deputy in charge.
b. The command level deputy in charge shall be instructed that every
permission to deviate must be documented by him as to reasons for, nature
of, and the effect of the deviation.
c. Personnel actually conducting the inspection and inquiry shall be instructed:
1. To be courteous and direct motorists to the checkpoint commander if
they wish to examine a copy of the checkpoint plan.
2. To limit the inspection and inquiry to less than one minute per vehicle
unless an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
an offense is, or has been committed.
3. Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists, to move the
vehicle out of line to a secure position where further investigation can
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be conducted without impeding the progress of other traffic through the
checkpoint.
4. To direct motorists to proceed with caution and exit the checkpoint area
when the inquiry is complete.
9.

A copy of this order shall be retained in the Court's file. The original shall be
issued to Lt. Craig Turner, the command officer who executed the application for
this order.

10. A copy of the roadblock plan and this signed authorization together with all
attachments shall be issued to the patrol sergeant participating and in command of
the operation of the checkpoint.
11. All enforcement officers participating in the operation of the checkpoint shall
conform their activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the
plan.
12. The checkpoint command level officer (patrol sergeant in charge) shall be available
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any motorist who has been
stopped at the checkpoint upon request of the motorist.
Based thereon, the undersigned hereby authorizes the foregoing Administrative Traffic
Checkpoint.
DATED this /

5~ day of

•T/^^*""

1992.

BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM G

H.B. 259, Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act
49th Legislature, Regular Session
Day 39,2/20/92
Tape 1 at 2957-3994
Sponsor: Rep. Ray Short.
Rep. Short:

This is a critical bill to the State. This is a must need bill. Let me give you
background on what happened. Police officers throughout the State thought
they had permission to set up roadblocks when and if they wanted and they
found out last March that they couldn't. The court of appeals here
overturned a case, and they held that according to the constitution, this
legislative body, is the one that must give permission or direction to set up
traffic checkpoints anywhere within this State. So, this bill is in response to
that. That according to the constitution, this bill is going to set up
permission, guidelines, and directions to set up traffic checkpoints
throughout the State by police officers. It really is a safety issue. It really has a
lot to do with alcohol and drunk driving. We don't need them on the road. There
is also another impact to this bill. If you look at the fiscal (inaudible), they've got
about $18,000 in it. But there's a federal program to give money to the State to
help with drunk driving problems and alcohol problems in the State. There are six
requirements that have to be met under the federal guidelines to get this federal
money to help us with drunk driving on the roads. We already meet four of them.
Senate Bill 101, which is coming, is the next requirement and this is the final
requirement that the State qualifies to receive plus or minus three-quarters of a
million dollars to help with the drug problems and the alcohol problems in the
State. That's basically the context of it. It can be set up to stop beer parties up in
the canyons, on graduation night. It's just a safety issue, so I urge your support of
this bill.

Rep. Tanner: I am just a little bit curious on one point. Less than a half hour ago, the sponsor of
the bill stood upon the House floor and said he appreciate being in this country
because of thefreedomof choice and so on and I think also that he was opposed
to doing anything about smoking or doing anything about helmets or seatbelts
because that was not an issue of safety and yet the bill that you are sponsoring
now is one that takes completefreedomof choice of drivers away and you are
saying that it is now a matter of safety. I'm just curious. I'd like to ask how this
is a matter of safety versus helmets or seatbelts or other things that were voted on
and why this is not a choice issue in your mind as much as the other issues that
you brought up today.
Rep. Short:

This is more of a legal issue than choice because it is needed in the State to help
the police officers do their job.
1

Rep. Tanner: You also said it was a safety issue.
Rep. Short:

It definitely is a safety issue and driving is a privilege. You have to get a license
to drive. It's kind-of funny, I was up the canyons about a summer or two ago
about graduation time. And I was in my little Alfa Romeo, I didn't look the least
bit like anybody who was drinking and I didn't mind being stopped. We got a lot
of problems. And I think all of us have been out, if you haven't been out with the
highway patrol, it's an education. And I was out with them one night until late in
the morning and I was amazed at what was on the road at that time. I just feel it's
a tremendous safety issue; it's a lot different than smoking. You can smoke all
you want but you're not going to run me over. You can drink all you want and
you might run me over. So, there's definitely a difference between smoking in a
room where you can inhale it yourself and driving a vehicle down the road drunk
and kill me. Smoking will not kill me directly, but driving a car under the
influence will kill me directly. I think that's the difference, Representative.

Rep. Tanner: In one item, it's a choice, and for those of us who supported the seatbelt issue
here, it was something that was a matter of safety; it had nothing really to do with
a matter of choice. I completely agree with what you are trying to do in this bill,
but I'm just trying to point out that now you say it's a matter of safety and not a
matter of choice. And, I just would like to comment on that.
Rep. Valentine:I rank in support of this bill and let me tell you why. There have been three
cases in the courts of appeals and supreme courts that lam familiar with and'
there may actually be more, where the court has tried to define how you
establish an administrative roadblock. The problem is that if you just go out
will-nilly saying ok, we are going to have a roadblock this weekend up Provo
Canyon, and we are going to stop every second vehicle, every third vehicle,
there's no way to attest to the due process that is administered to that
administrative roadblock* What this bill attempts to do is to codify, and say
these are the criteria that you're gonna use, these are the standards that you
are gonna conduct the roadblock by and these are the types of things you're
going to try to look for. It's a problem of balancing between the free flow of the
traffic through the canyon or through the other place you are doing it or conduct a
checkpoint, and the need to protect us from drivers who are under the influence of
alcohol. What this bill does is it attempts to address those cases and to define
how it can be done without having to be challenged each and every time there
is a citation issue or a DUI taken to the jail. So this bill really is need for that
purpose. Yeah there's safety issues, yeah there's issue that we talked about
already, but there's really the issue of trying to narrow it down so we have, in
effect, a cookbook that we can follow in our public safety department and say
that if you follow the cookbook, this citation's gonna stand. If you don't
follow the cookbook, then you have a challenge. So, I speak in favor of the bill.
2

Rep. Voight: Representative, I'm in full support of this bill, but where are you gonna get the
police officers to do be able to do this? I've been out riding with the police
officers and when they've got two and three on for the whole evening, where are
you gonna get the police officers to set up these checkpoints? We are so low on
officers right now on the highway. They want to put in photocops because they
don't have the officers that patrol for speeding. Where are we gonna get the
police officers to set up these checkpoints is my question.
Rep. Short:

The police officers are there, and this is a much more efficient system.

Rep. Voight: I agree with you.
Rep. Short:

It's something that they plan. It won't be willy nilly. They have to go to a
magistrate before they set it up so they've got the time, the energy, and the
manpower to do it.

Rep. Voight: I've questioned them on speed traps on the highways. They've said they can't do
it because they just don't have enough officers. If they set up a checkpoint,
there's probably going to be 8 to 10 officers that have to be out there at one time.
They don't have that many in a whole district at one time anymore, until you put
more police officers on. Would this help to put more police officers on?
Rep. Short:

They don't do it all the time. It's just at a set time, place, necessity, need, you
know, as we were out with the highway patrol, we had six in our little section too.
They've got the manpower to do it, but they don't just do it willy nilly, that's
what this bill is gonna do; it's gonna make it planned and programed, magistrateassisted, and it will help.

Rep. Voight: Thank you. I'm in support of your bill.
Rep. Short:

Thank you.

Rep Price:

Representative Short, what will this do to the trucking industry? You know they
get so many pounds of gross weight on them, get rolling and they have to stop for
normal inspections and road inspections and so forth. What will this do to the
trucking industry and in slowing them down?

Rep. Short:

I don't know what it will do in slowing them down. I doubt very much that this is
going to be set up to stop the truckers. We're more interested in the alcohol and
the driving under the influence.

Rep. Price:

Have you talked to the trucking industry and how do they feel about it.
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Rep. Short:

I have no input and it's been out for a while.

Rep. Price:

You've haven't had any input?

Rep. Short:

I've had no input from the truckers.

Rep. Uipi:

I wish to make an amendment Mr. speaker.

Speaker:

Proceed, Representative.

Rep. Uipi:

Page 5, line 7, after the word "activities," take out "as nearly as practicable" and ?
then insert "strictly" to the procedures outlined in the plan.

Speaker:

Strictly to the procedures what?

Rep. Uipi:

Strictly to the, well, the word that is inserted is just "strictly."

Speaker:

So we're just inserting the word strictly. So it would read "confirm his activities
strictly to the procedures outlined in the plan," is that correct Representative?

Rep. Uipi:

Excuse me, my cohort here was talking to me while I was ah trying to present my
point here.

Speaker:

So there word we're deleting is "as nearly as practicable" and we're inserting the
word "strictly," is that correct?

Rep. Uipi:

That's correct.

Speaker:
Rep. Uipi:

Ok. Proceed Representative.
I think its only fair especially when you know we are driving down the street and
we're stopped, I think the police officers, sheriffs need to adhere strictly to the
plan. I don't think we need to give them leeway because we may be heading
down the canyon and heading to Provo or on our way or anywhere we may be
heading and we'll be stopped and basically for 15,20, 30,40 minutes, however
long, and I think they need to adhere strictly to what has been outlined in the plan,
in the checkpoint plan. Otherwise, they can drag on this thing for too long. So I
would urge your support of this motion. I think it would just help the patron of
the street as well as the officer so that he can just don't do whatever he wants to
do. Or he may, on his own discretion. So I hope you will support this motion.

Rep. Short:

I do not mind taking out "as nearly as practicable" but I would just, "strictly" is an
extremely difficult word to deal with. I'd just as soon have "in accordance with
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the plan." "Strictly" opens up a whole can of worms too, I think. So I would
kinda, I'd take half of the amendment but... would object to the strictly part.
Rep. Harward: Boy I speak strongly against this amendment. When you're talking about a plan
that talks about minimizing the length of time, and minimizing intrusion, and
minimizing fear, how do you put a concrete, explicit, specific on there? And if
you then turn around and say you have to strictly comply, boy you've got a
standard that's just about impossible. You basically throw this bill away to say
the slightest technical deviation, we complain at lot about technicalities that get
people off, well you just created about every group of technicalities you ever saw
in this bill to put strict compliance in it. As nearly as practical, gives the judge the
opportunity to look at the circumstances and see if the intent of the officer, and the
efforts of the officer, and the substantial portion of what they were doing was to
comply. But it doesn't hang up on one ticky, technical violation of a strict word.
It was four minutes and fifteen seconds instead of four minutes that the intrusion
was, I would strongly urge that we not give all these technicalities to the person
who is trying to defend a drunk driving charge because it went five seconds over.
Rep. Uipi:

I think, if we go back to thefreedomissue, you need to understand that one drunk
driver may be stopped, but there may be 50 or 60 of us behind the drunk driver.
And, it's important the we need to take him out of the street, but nonetheless, we
need to protect our right of those who do not drink and drive and in a hurry to go
to their own destination. I think it's a good amendment and I think that we need
to, that you need to support it Thank you.

Speaker:

Motion to amend is found on page 5, line 7 to delete "as nearly as practical" and
insert "strictly." Those in favor say "aye." Opposed. Motion to amend fails.

Rep. Short:

In other words, it's just a stop; a willy nilly approach but they have to get a
magistrate to say it's ok.

Rep. Jorgensen: And there is a pressing need for this? What is that?
Rep. Short:

Ok. The pressing need is the court of appeals has stated that it's the
legislature that must get this legislation passed so that the police officers have
permission to do this. That's one. Right now the courts have ruled they
cannot do it at all. So this is in response that we perform our duty under the
constitution and that we as a legislative body must have this legislation to
allow traffic checkpoints. That's one. The other thing is it will create a fund
from the federal government to help us to combat drunken driving on the roads
and the drugs that are goingfreelyacross.
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Rep. Jorgensen: Is this what this is aimed at then? The problems that they are having in
Southern Utah? Is this the primary aim or the sole aim o r . . .
Rep. Short:

The primary aim is the courts have ruled they can't do it without us telling
them to. And this is the method to give them permission to do it.

Rep. Jorgensen: They cannot, can't do what?
Rep. Short:

They cannot have... Traffic checkpoints right now, it's against the law.

Rep. Jorgensen: Well, I guess I'm not being clear. The first four conditions under, on the top of
page three, are already in existence. What you're adding is condition number
five, is that, that's what I understood. Did I miss that?
Rep. Short:

That's correct. It's a procedural thing.

Rep. Jorgensen: Ok. Then, what you're saying is that the FBI kind-of stereotype kind-of thing
that says you can stop, that these people are drug people, or X or Y, or Z, that's
not allowed under a checkpoint, it that what you're addressing?
Rep. Short:

I'm not sure what you're saying. We can't have a checkpoint without this bill.
Period. We can have emergency checkpoints. But we gotta have this
permission to set up a controlled, approved by a magistrate, checkpoint.

Rep. Jorgensen: Condition number then three doesn't cover that? Under reasonable cause, that
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has occurred or is occurring?
Rep. Short:

No. This has been challenged in court and the bill is needed to give the
courts jurisdiction.

Rep. Jorgensen: Alright. Thank you.
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